Summaries tagged Comparative Politics

• Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson: The colonial origins of comparative development
• Aldrich: Why parties
• Ames: Electoral strategy under open-list proportional representation
• Andeweg: Consociational democracy
• Arriola: Where there is no alternative
• Batto: The adverse consequences of trust in government
• Baum: Breaking authoritarian bonds
• Bermeo: Ordinary people in extraordinary times
• Berrebi and Klor: Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism? Direct Evidence from the Israeli Electorate
• Bhavnani: Do Electoral Quotas Work after They Are Withdrawn? Evidence from a Natural Experiment in India
• Blais: To vote or note to vote
• Boix: Setting the rules of the game
• Bratton and Van de Walle: Democratic experiments in Africa
• Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi: Public opinion, democracy, and market reform in Africa
• Brubaker and Laitin: Ethnic and nationalist violence
• Calvo and Murillo: Who delivers
• Carey and Shugart: Incentives to cultivate a personal vote
• Chandler: Federalism and political parties. In Federalism and the Role of the State, Herman Bakvis and Willia
• Cheibub: Presidentialism and democratic performance
• Cheng and Haggard: Democracy and deficits in Taiwan
• Chhibber and Kollman: Party aggregation and the number of parties in India and the United States
• Cohen, McCubbins, and Rosenbluth: The political economy or nuclear power
• Collier: Paths toward democracy
• Comisso: Federalism and nationalism in post-socialist eastern Europe
• Cox and McCubbins: Setting the agenda
• Cox and McCubbins: The Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy Outcomes
• Cox: Electoral rules and electoral coordination
• Cox: Making votes count
• Cox: The Efficient Secret
• Crisp, Moreno, and Shugart: The accountability deficit in Latin America
• Dalton and Wattenberg: Parties without partisans
• De Figueiredo, Spiller, and Urbiztondo: An informational perspective on adminsitrative procedures
• Denny and Doyle: Does Voting History Matter? Analysing Persistence in Turnout
• Desposato: The impact of electoral rules on legislative parties
• Dewan and Myatt: The Declining Talent Pool of Government
• Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Weingast: Tragic brilliance
• Dickson and Scheve: Social identity, political speech, and electoral competition
• Dixit and Londregan: The determinants of success of special interests in redistributive politics
• Downs: An economic theory of democracy
• Downs: Inside bureaucracy
• Doyle: Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs
• Eaton: Can politicians control bureaucrats
• Edelman: Social movements
• Epstein and O'Halloran: Administrative procedures, information, and agency discretion
• Epstein and O'Halloran: Delegating Powers
• Ertman: Birth of the leviathan
• Evans and Rauch: Bureaucracy and growth
• Fama: Agency problems and the theory of the firm
• Fearon and Laitin: Explaining interethnic cooperation
• Ferejohn and Shipan: Congressional influence on administrative agencies
• Ferejohn: Incumbent performance and electoral control
• Ferree: Explaining South Africa's racial census
• Ferree: The social origins of electoral volatility in Africa
• Figueiredo and Limongi: Presidential power, legislative organization, and party behavior in Brazil
• Fish: The determinants of economic reforms in the post-Communist world
• Franklin: Voter turnout and the dynamics of electoral competition in established democracies since 1945
• Geddes: Politician's Dilemma
• Geddes: What do we know about democratization after 20 years
• Geisler: Fair
• Geys: Explaining voter turnout
• Gibson: A sober second thought
• Gimpelson and Treisman: Fiscal games and public employment
• Golden: Electoral connections
• Greif: Self-enforcing political systems and economic growth
• Gurr: Peoples versus States
• Gurr: Why men rebel
• Gutmann: Democracy
• Haas: What is nationalism and why should we study it
• Haggard and Kaufman: The political economy of democratic transitions
• Haggard and Noble: Power politics
• Harff: No lessons learned from the Holocaust
• Hechter and Okamoto: Political consequences of minority group formation
• Heclo: A government of strangers
• Hicken: Engineering aggregation
• Holmes: Precommitment and the paradox of democracy
• Hont: The permanent crisis of a divided mankind
• Horowitz: Ethnic groups in conflict
• Huber and Lupia: Cabinet instability and delegation in parliamentary democracies
• Huber and McCarty: Bureaucratic capacity, delegation, and political reform
• Huber and Shipan: Deliberate discretion
• Huber: Delegation to civil servants in parliamentary democracies
• Huntington: The Clash of Civilizations
• Hyde: Can international election observers deter fraud
• Jackman and Miller: Social capital and politics
• Jowitt: New World Disorder
• Kato: Politicians, bureaucrats, and interest groups in Japan
• Katzenstein and et al: The role of theory in comparative politics
• Kaviraj and Khilnani: Civil society
• Keck: Social equity and environmental politics in Brazil
• Keefer: Clientelism, Credibility, and Democracy
• Kiewiet and McCubbins: The Logic of Delegation
• Kitschelt: Linkages between citizens and politicans in democratic politics
• Kopstein and Reilly: Explaining the why of the why
• Korpi and Palme: New politics and class politics in the context of austerity and globalization
• Krasner: Approaches to the state
• La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Pop Eleches, and Shleifer: Judicial Checks and Balances
• Lake and Rothchild: Territorial decentralization and civil war settlements
• Laver and Shepsle: Coalitions and Cabinet Government
• Legro: Military culture and inadvertent escalation in World War II
• Lehoucq and Molina: Stuffing the ballot box
• Levitsky and Cameron: Political parties and regime change in Fujimori's Peru
• Lijphart: Comparative politics and the comparative method
• Lijphart: Democracy in plural societies
• Lijphart: Multiethnic democracy
• Lijphart: Patterns of democracy
• Lijphart: The wave of power-sharing democracy
• Linkberg: It's our time to chop
• Linz and Stepan: Problems of democratic transition and consolidation
• Linz: Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy
• Lipset and Rokkan: Party systems and voter alignments
• Lowi: The end of liberalism
• Luebbert: Social foundations of political order in interwar Europe
• Lustick: Stability in divided societies
• MacIntyre: Institutions and Investors
• Mackie: Ending footbinding and infibulation
• Magagna: Communities of grain
• Mainwaring and Scully: Building democratic institutions
• Mainwaring and Shugart: Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America
• Makumba: Zimbabwe's hijacked election
• Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes: Elections and representation
• March and Olson: Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions
• Mares: Strategic alliances and social policy reform
• Martin and Stevenson: Government formation in parliamentary democracies
• McCubbins and Noble: Perceptions and realities of Japanese budgeting
• McCubbins and Schwartz: Congressional oversight overlooked
• McCubbins and Thies: As a matter of factions
• Mishler and Rose: What are the origins of political trust
• Moe: Political institutions
• Moore: Social origins of dictatorship and democracy
• Moser: Electoral systems and the number of parties in postcommunist states
• Mueller: Public Choice III
• Muller and Seligson: Inequality and insurgency
• Muller and Strom: Policy, office, or votes
• Nacif: Understanding party discipline in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies
• Narizny: Both guns and butter, or neither
• Nichter: Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot
• Niou and Paolino: The rise of the opposition party in Taiwan
• Norris: Democratic Phoenix
• North: A neoclassical theory of the state
• O'Donnell: Illusions and conceptual flaws
• Olson: Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development
• Patel: Ayatollahs on the Pareto Frontier
• Popkin: Public choice and rural development
• Posada-Carba: Democracy, parties, and political finance in Latin America
• Posner: Institutions and ethnic politics in Africa
• Powell: Elections as instruments of democracy
• Przeworski and Wallerstein: The structure of class conflict in democratic capitalist societies
• Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi: Democracy and development
• Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi: What makes democracies endure
• Przeworski: Democracy and the market
• Putnam: Making Democracy Work
• Ramseyer and Rosenbluth: Japan's political marketplace
• Reilly: Democracy in divided societies
• Rigger: Machine politics in protracted transition in Taiwan
• Riker: Federalism, in Handbook of Political Science
• Riker: Political science and rational choice
• Rodden: The dilemma of fiscal federalism
• Roeder: Power dividing as an alternative to ethnic power-sharing
• Rogowski: Political cleavages and changing exposure to trade
• Rokkan: State formation, nation-building, and mass politics in Europe
• Rose: The end of consensus in Austria and Switzerland
• Rustow: Transitions to democracy
• Samuels: Concurrent elections, discordant results
• Samuels: The gubernatorial coattails effect
• Schaffer: Democracy in translation
• Schamis: Distributional coalitions and the politics of economic reform in Latin America
• Scheiner: Democracy without competition in japan
• Schumpeter: Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy
• Shapiro: Democracy Innovation
• Shepsle: Studying Institutions
• Shugart and Carey: Presidents and Assemblies
• Shugart and Haggard: Institutions and Public Policy in Presidential Systems
• Shugart: Presidentialism, parliamentarism, and the provision of collective goods in less-developed countries
• Skocpol: States and social revolutions
• Snyder: From voting to violence
• Soskice: Divergent production regimes
• Spruyt: Institutional selection in international relations
• Stallings: International influence on economic policy, debt stabilization, and structural reform
• Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth: Structuring Politics
• Stepan and Skach: Presidentialism and Parliamentarism Compared
• Stokes: Perverse accountability
• Strom: Agency and Parliamentary Democracy
• Strom: Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies
• Tarrow: Power in movement
• Tarrow: Transnational political contention and institutions in international politics
• Tavits: The development of stable party support
• Thies: Keeping tabs on partners
• Treisman: Political decentralization and economic reform
• Treisman: The causes of corruption
• Tsebelis and Money: Bicameralism
• Tsebelis: Nested games
• Tsebelis: Veto Players
• Volden: A formal model of the politics of delegation in a separation of powers system
• Wantchekon: Clientelism and voting behavior
• Weber: Class, status, party
• Weber: Methodology of the Social Sciences
• Weber: The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism
• Weingast: The economic role of political institutions
• Wilkinson: Votes and violence
• Wilson: Bureaucracy