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Epstein and O'Halloran: Administrative procedures, information, and agency discretion

Disclaimer. Don't rely on these old notes in lieu of reading the literature, but they can jog your memory. As a grad student long ago, my peers and I collaborated to write and exchange summaries of political science research. I posted them to a wiki-style website. "Wikisum" is now dead but archived here. I cannot vouch for these notes' accuracy, nor can I even say who wrote them. If you have more recent summaries to add to this collection, send them my way I guess. Sorry for the ads; they cover the costs of keeping this online.

Epstein and O'Halloran. 1994. Administrative procedures, information, and agency discretion. AJPS 38:697-722.

Much of the game theory here was beyond me, but here's the general gist.

MAIN IDEA

"As [Congress's ex post] agenda control increases and problems of asymmetric information decline [i.e. Congress has better technical information], Congress will delegate a minimum level of ex ante discretionary authority to an agency, regardless of differences in policy preferences" (715).

In other words:

CONCERNS

Research on similar subjects

Tags

Political ScienceComparative PoliticsPrincipal-AgentUncertaintyInformation

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