Disclaimer. Don't rely on these old notes in lieu of reading the literature, but they can jog your memory. As a grad student long ago, my peers and I collaborated to write and exchange summaries of political science research. I posted them to a wiki-style website. "Wikisum" is now dead but archived here. I cannot vouch for these notes' accuracy, nor can I say who wrote them.
Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi. 2005. Public opinion, democracy, and market reform in Africa. Cambridge.
By reviewing Afrobaromter data, the authors see African public opinion as both a cause and a consequence of political and economic reform. The authors examine demand for democracy, perceived supply of democracy, demand for market reforms, and perceived supply of market reforms. They see demand for democracy as "largely intrinsic (as a goal valued in and of itself)," but "evaluations of the supply of economic reform are highly instrumental" (i.e. they depend on "improvements in the material conditions of life") (p 10).
As shown in Table 1.1 (p 17), African countries vary dramatically in their commitment to democracy. Similarly, they vary in their degree of compliance with (IMF and World Bank) economic reform programs (see Table 1.2, p 23). Empirically, political and economic reform appear to coincide: those that successfully introduced democracy also successfully followed through on reforms (p 24).
Consolidation is a fuzzy concept. Institutionalists see considation occurring when everything happens according to the accepted institutional rules. Culturalists, on the other hand, look for evidence of democratic norms and values, and a readiness to defend democracy if it is threatened.
The authors claim that consolidation occurs when "popular demands for democracy [are] accompanied by a supply of democratic institutions provided mainly, though not exclusively, by political elites" (p 29). An equilibrium of supply and demand represents consolidation. "Only if citizens perceive that democratic institutions are being supplied ... can we infer that their country's regime is consolidating as a democracy" (p 30). [Schaffer might have a problem with this.]
[Critique: this is weird. This equilibrium would measure only regime stability, not democratic stability. It assumes that people actually demand democracy. But see authors' concession on p 28.]
The authors, then, make five points about consolidation:
The authors seek to combine findings from previous chapters into a single model of African attitudes. They generally argue for "a learning theory of cognitive rationality" (p 272): Africans' cognitive response to adult experiences with reform determines their attitudes more than anything else does, although the authors do leave room for other factors (especially institutional and social factors).
Cognitive factors affect people's demand for democracy. "Popular demand for democracy is primarily a product of citizens who are mentally engaged with public affairs" (p274). In particular, if they perceive democracy as a system of checks and balances, they are most likely to demand democracy.
There are some other influences. Social factors, like membership in the postcolonial and postdemocratic generations, certainly contribute to a higher demand for democracy.
The authors take a chapter to see whether their data allow them to predict (self-reported) voting, participation in protests, and other types of political involvement (Table 12.1, p 297).
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