Weingast: The economic role of political institutions
Disclaimer. Don't rely on these old notes in lieu of reading the literature, but they can jog your memory. As a grad student long ago, my peers and I collaborated to write and exchange summaries of political science research. I posted them to a wiki-style website. "Wikisum" is now dead but archived here. I cannot vouch for these notes' accuracy, nor can I even say who wrote them. If you have more recent summaries to add to this collection, send them my way I guess. Sorry for the ads; they cover the costs of keeping this online.
Weingast. 1995. The economic role of political institutions: Market-Preserving federalism and economic development. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11 (1): 1-31..
In brief: In a thriving market, you need both a well-designed economic system and a political system that "limits the ability of the state to confiscate wealth:" in other words, "limited government, that is, political institutions that credibly commit the state to honor economic and political rights." Federalism was a key element in the economic rise of England and the US. It is also helping China's recent growth.
Research by the same authors
- De Figueiredo and Weingast: The rationality of fear
- Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Weingast: Tragic brilliance
- Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast: Coordination, commitment, and enforcement
- McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast: Administrative procedures as instruments of political control
- McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast: Structure and process, politics and policy
- Milgrom, North, and Weingast: The role of institutions in the revival of trade
- Weingast and Marshall: The industrial organization of Congress
- Weingast and Moran: Bureaucratic discretion or Congressional control
Research on similar subjects
- Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson: The colonial origins of comparative development (3 shared tags)
- Lake and Rothchild: Territorial decentralization and civil war settlements (3 shared tags)
- Olson: Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development (3 shared tags)
- Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi: Democracy and development (3 shared tags)
- Evans and Rauch: Bureaucracy and growth (2 shared tags)
- Samuels: Concurrent elections, discordant results (2 shared tags)
- Shugart: Presidentialism, parliamentarism, and the provision of collective goods in less-developed countries (2 shared tags)
- Tsebelis and Money: Bicameralism (2 shared tags)
Weingast, Barry (author) • Comparative Politics • Federalism • Development • Growth • Credible Commitment
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