Strom: Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies

Strom. 2000. Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies. European Journal of Political Research 37 (May): 261-289.

In its ideal type, parliamentarism is a single chain of delegation (with each agent having only one principal), while presidentialism has multiple paths of delegation.

• Presidential systems have more complex delegation than parliamentary systems
• Parliamentary systems are better at selection, so they avoid adverse selection (b/c leaders have long experience and must be tested in the party's ranks as they progress from backbencher to minister to prime minister)
  • But they risk moral hazard, b/c the executive and legislature are led by the same party/coalition, so they have little incentive to look over one another's shoulders. [BUT doesn't prime minister have an incentive to preserve the party name? Otherwise, he's out of leadership.]
  • Thus, ineffective accountability and poor transparency. Parliamentarism's challenge: decaying screening devices and diverted accountabilities
• Presidential systems risk greater adverse selection, but they have better sanctioning mechanisms to prevent moral hazard (e.g. checks and balances, term limits, opposition in the legislature, judicial review)
  • Thus, greater transparency and accountability
  • But they risk adverse selection, b/c outsiders can get office, and those who run often have had little experience in their parties or in the national spotlight