Disclaimer. Don't rely on these old notes in lieu of reading the literature, but they can jog your memory. As a grad student long ago, my peers and I collaborated to write and exchange summaries of political science research. I posted them to a wiki-style website. "Wikisum" is now dead but archived here. I cannot vouch for these notes' accuracy, nor can I even say who wrote them. If you have more recent summaries to add to this collection, send them my way I guess. Sorry for the ads; they cover the costs of keeping this online.
Haggard and Noble. 2000. Power politics: Elections and electricity regulation in Taiwan. In Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy, eds. Haggard and McCubbins.
Like Cohen, McCubbins, and Rosenbluth (1995), Haggard and Noble argue that institutions affect regulatory policy. The authors refer primarily to "separation of power and purpose," but their concept is essentially the same as Cohen et al's: veto points. They illustrate their argument by following Taiwan's regulation of electricity (Y) through three periods in which X (degree of separation, i.e. number of veto players) varies: early authoritarianism (KMT dominant but subject to US pressure), consolidated authoritarianism (a single veto gate--KMT--with a long time horizon), and democracy (many veto gates).
The hypothesis resembles Cohen et al's. As the number of veto gates increases,
There are many findings, but the two main conclusions about the effects of democracy (i.e. more veto players) closely mirror Cohen et al's:
KEY IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY:
Immediately after the war, the KMT was dominant, albeit with some internal factions. Chang Kai-shek moved quickly to consolidate his personal power, banning opposition parties and such. However, Taiwan was heavily dependent on foreign aid (from the US), especially in rebuilding (electricity) infrastructure. Thus, although the KMT wanted to favor state-owned industries (and it did, because there were no institutional incentives to heed rural or commercial constituencies), the US had a veto over regulatory policy (since it could cancel funding). THUS, the US forced the KMT to abandon its goal of cheap power for key supporters and instead charge enough to eventually make its electric utilities self-sufficient (i.e. the US made them raise rates high enough to fund future investment, so the US could quit sending aid).
As aid was reduced, the KMT might have reverted to its old ways--BUT the successful export-led growth strategy and increasing electrical shortages made it worth KMT's while to ensure continued building of new power plants. Moreover, Taipower's newfound profitability could serve other political ends. Thus, it became rational for KMT to continue this strategy.
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY
The transition to democracy involved adopting the single-nontransferrable vote (like in Japan), creating strong incentives for candidate-centered politics. Thus, the shift to democracy meant a shift FROM a strongly centralized policy with autonomy from many interest groups TO a democratic system that gives candidates strong incentives to build up an independent base--i.e. to listen to interest groups.
Legislative and electoral competition meant that legislators would use influence to prevent new power plants from being built (e.g. for environmental reasons). This decreased investment in utilities, thus reducing electrical capacity (as demand continued to grow). Although the KMT retained a legislative majority, it was unable to push through new plant legislation (since many KMT legislators would oppose the party line). In one case, Taipower was able to win approval only by paying millions to the communities around the chosen site.
Research on similar subjects