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Dixit and Londregan. 1996. The determinants of success of special interests in redistributive politics. JOP 58: 1132-55.
Why do some groups get more pork than others? More precisely, why determines whether politicians will funnel pork towards loyalists versus towards swing groups?
X: Parties might be equally able to provide pork to any group, or they may have advantages in providing to only certain groups (i.e. to loyalists).
Y: Will parties compete to provide pork to the same (moderate) groups or provide pork primarily to loyalists?
When parties have an equal ability to provide pork to any group (X), they will funnel pork toward swing groups (Y). Note that parties do not distribute directly to voters that promise to support them; instead, they target pork at groups that have lots of persuadable voters. And a group of voters might be more persuadable for a few reasons:
When parties have a comparative advantage at providing pork to certain groups (e.g. when you have machine politics), then they will channel redistribution toward core supporters. This is more efficient (due to your comparative advantage) than trying to figure out which other groups you might be able to persuade.
Contrast with Stokes (2005).
Research on similar subjects
Dixit, Avinash (author) • Londregan, John (author) • Comparative Politics • Interest Groups • Redistribution • Clientelism
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