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Huber and McCarty. 2004. Bureaucratic capacity, delegation, and political reform. APSR 98 (3):481-94.
Low BC reduces the incentives to comply with legislation. This is because the ineffective bureaucrat will have to move much further from her preferred point in order to reduce the risk of noncompliance. At some point, reducing risk simply isn't worth the loss in preferred actions. See Figure 3.
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Huber, John (author) • McCarty, Nolan (author) • Comparative Politics • Bureaucracy • Civil Service Reform
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