Disclaimer. Don't rely on these old notes in lieu of reading the literature, but they can jog your memory. As a grad student long ago, my peers and I collaborated to write and exchange summaries of political science research. I posted them to a wiki-style website. "Wikisum" is now dead but archived here. I cannot vouch for these notes' accuracy, nor can I even say who wrote them. If you have more recent summaries to add to this collection, send them my way I guess. Sorry for the ads; they cover the costs of keeping this online.
MacIntyre. 2001. Institutions and Investors: The Politics of the Economic Crisis in Southeast Asia. International Organization 55 (1): 81-122.
In the Asian financial crisis, the investment reversal (Y) was bigger in some countries than in others. Political institutions (X) explain this divergence, specifically "the distribution of veto authority." This distribution places states' policy postures on a continuum between rigidity and volatility--and both extremes are very bad for investors. Wider distribution of veto authority leads to greater risk of rigidity, and tighter concentration of veto authority leads to greater risk of volatility. Thus, there is a u-shaped relationship between the number of veto players (X) and policy risk for investors (Y); Figure 4 (p 94) places this study's four cases on this u-curve.
So how do veto players affect capital flight? "Regardless of the initial conditions in a given country or in the international economy, governments can make the situation better or worse for investors" (82). Policy is the intervening variable between institutions and investor panic. This article takes an institutional approach, showing that regimes with policy rigidity or volatility had the most problems. Thus:
Institutional framework --> policy posture (rigid vs volatile) --> investment (see page 84).
Other things matter too, but he ignores them here--he admittedly pursues a partial argument, demonstrating only that the variable of concern to him matters.
The author uses George Tsebelis' veto player framework: As the number of veto players increases, policy stability also increases. Having more than one veto player helps to reduce the likelihood of policy volatility, but there is some point of inflexion after which additional veto players become unwelcome, serving only to increase the likelihood of policy rigidity. The fewer the veto players, the greater the risk to investors of policy volatility; the greater the number of veto players, the greater the risk to investors of policy rigidity. Therefore, this relationship is represented in more of a U-shaped curve rather than a linear function. See figure 3 on pg. 89.
See figure 4 on page 94. A "most similar" design, using four SE Asian countries that were similar in important ways but had varying distributions of veto authority and varying levels of investment flight (see page 82 for case selection).
With the onset of the crisis, there was too much political interference. There were at least six veto players who had fragmented control over policy. This enhanced the government's inability to deliver necessary policy adjustments, which scared investors.
The steady and coherent policy response of the Philippine government helped it to avoid a substantially worse investment reversal. The administration showed relative coherence and consistency of policy management. With only three veto players, timely policy adjustment was possible. The constraints on executive action from the legislature and the judiciary were sufficient to preclude the possibility of radical policy volatility--the syndrome we observe in Malaysia and Indonesia. Alone among the four cases, the Philippines did not see its credit rating fall sharply during the crisis--its rating, instead, held steady.
Having only one veto player made strong surges in one policy direction and then the other and then back again possible (volatility). Malaysia's institutional framework was very permissive of flexible policy action--strong action in any direction. This led to investor insecurity and the worsening of the crisis.
Although both the House and the President had veto power, the centralization of power on the President has led to his sole decision making power in the matter of the crisis. He has changed his policy choices almost daily, leading to severe policy volatility, which for investors became intolerable. With policy signals fluctuating so wildly and with there being no institutional mechanism for the government to make credible policy commitments, there was a rapid and total collapse in investment. Investors had no basis for predicting government policy nor for trusting government promises. Exit was the only reasonable option.
A heavy concentration of veto authority, especially in a weakly democratic or authoritarian context, produces an inherent risk of policy volatility. A wide dispersal of veto authority produces an inherent risk of policy rigidity. Intermediate configurations make policy sticky but leave some room for adjustment. The institutional framework alone is not a sufficient factor to explain the diverse outcomes, but it is a necessary factor. Institutions do not drive policy, but they do impose parameters on what is possible.
Research on similar subjects