Summaries tagged Information

• Akerlof: The market for lemons
• Alchian and Demsetz: Production, information costs, and economic organization
• Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida: Foreign affairs and issue voting
• Ansolabehere and Iyengar: Riding the wave and claiming ownership over issues
• Ansolabehere and Jones: Constituents' Responses to Congressional Roll-Call Voting
• Arceneaux: The federal face of voting
• Atkeson and Partin: Candidate Advertisemens, media coverage, and citizen attitudes
• Basinger and Lavine: Ambivalence, information, and electoral chioce
• Bawn: Political control versus expertise
• Burden: United States Senators as presidential candidates
• Campbell, Green, and Layman: The Party Faithful: Partisan Images, Candidate Religion, and the Electoral Impact of Party Identification
• Campbell, Green, and Layman: The Party Faithful: Partisan Images, Candidate Religion, and the Electoral Impact of Party Identification
• Converse: The nature of belief systems in mass publics
• Cowhey: Domestic institutions and the credibility of international commitments
• De Figueiredo and Weingast: The rationality of fear
• De Figueiredo, Spiller, and Urbiztondo: An informational perspective on adminsitrative procedures
• Druckman, Kifer, and Parkin: Campaign Communications in U.S. Congressional Elections
• Epstein and O'Halloran: Administrative procedures, information, and agency discretion
• Fearon and Laitin: Explaining interethnic cooperation
• Fearon: Rationalist explanations for war
• Gartzke: War is in the error term
• Gourevitch: The governance problem in international relations
• Hart: Incomplete contracts and the theory of the firm
• Huber and Lupia: Cabinet instability and delegation in parliamentary democracies
• Jervis: Hypotheses on misperception
• Jervis: War and misperception
• Kiewiet and McCubbins: The Logic of Delegation
• Lake and Rothchild: Containing fear
• Lupia and McCubbins: The Democratic Dilemma
• Lupia, Levine, Menning, and Sin: Were Bush tax cut supporters simply ignorant
• Lupia: Busy voters, agenda control, and the power of information
• Lupia: Shortcuts versus encyclopedias
• McCubbins and Schwartz: Congressional oversight overlooked
• McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast: Administrative procedures as instruments of political control
• Milgrom, North, and Weingast: The role of institutions in the revival of trade
• Milner: Interests, institutions, and information
• Moe: Political institutions
• Morrow: The strategic setting of choices
• Mutz: Effects of "in-your-face" television discourse on perceptions of a legitimate opposition
• Nie et al: The World Wide Web and the U.S. Political News Market
• Popkin, Gorman, Phillips, and Smith: Comment
• Popkin: Public choice and rural development
• Popkin: The reasoning voter
• Schultz: Do democratic institutions constrain or inform
• Shepsle: Studying Institutions
• Strom: Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies
• Varian: Intermediate microeconomics