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Disclaimer. Don't rely on these old notes in lieu of reading the literature, but they can jog your memory. As a grad student long ago, my peers and I collaborated to write and exchange summaries of political science research. I posted them to a wiki-style website. "Wikisum" is now dead but archived here. I cannot vouch for these notes' accuracy, nor can I say who wrote them.
Gartzke. 1999. War is in the error term. International Organization 53 (summer): 567-587.
If we take Fearon's arguments seriously, we arrive at a paradox: There must be some element of randomness that explains war. Consider the universe of possible conflicts (every possible dyad). Theories about capabilities rule out some of them. Theories about motives rule out more. Theories of bluffing (e.g. Fearon's) rule out some more. But we've still got a few cases that we cannot theorize about within a rationalist framework. These theories all give only necessary conditions, not sufficient conditions, for war. In cases that satisfy all these necessary conditions, the occurrence of war is random. Moreover, if we accept Fearon's argument about uncertainty, then we cannot possibly identify a sufficient condition for war within a rationalist framework--because we can never predict whether bluffing will be met with a raise or a fold.
When we do a study, we should have peace as Y, not X. All our IR theories identify necessary (not sufficient) conditions for war; turn this around, and it means they all identify sufficient conditions for peace. So when one of these is present, you will have peace; when none is, you will have war or peace.
Gartzke's argument refines Fearon's (and includes and excellent summary of Fearon's work). You must understand Fearon to understand Gartzke.
Gartzke summarizes Fearon's three Xs: incentives to bluff, commitment problems, and issue indivisibility. Fearon argued that issue indivisibility (Fearon's X3) has no empirical effect. Gartzke adds that commitment problems (Fearon's X2) don't get us far either. They might help explain war initiation, but they would make it harder to explain war termination.
For example, suppose A (declining state) attacks B (rising state) to prevent B from becoming dominant. Bargaining can't prevent this conflict, because B can't credibly commit not to attack A in the future. Suppose A cripples B, ensuring that it won't outpace B. But the conflict won't end if the thing that started it hasn't gone away; and A now cannot credibly commit not to abuse B. So B would have to fight to the death, which rarely happens. So preventive wars will always be total war. Since states would know this, there would be a built in deterrent against preventive wars, making bargaining more likely to succeed.
Thus, X2 has problems. As Gartzke puts it: "The logic of preventive war thus implies one of three conclusions. First, if a solution exists to the commitment problem and states are assumed to be fully informed, then ex ante bargaining can occur for the same reasons discussed elsewhere by Fearon. Second, if a solution exists but states are hampered by uncertainty and incentives to bluff, then preventive war is really just a special case of Fearon's first explanation. Third, if no solution to the commitment problem exists, then the costs of such contests are presumably extremely high. States are likely to anticipate the destructiveness of preventive war and avoid it in all but extreme situations." [see Wagner 2000]
"Given uncertainty and incentives to bluff, there are NO factors that lead the mechanisms explaining the occurrence of war to systematically produce one outcome over another. Properly understood, the causal mechanisms that explain the occurrence of war from crises in large samples are stochastic."
A central point: If uncertainty matters, then something must be random.
Gartzke claims that uncertainty (bluffing) can lead to either war or peace. Thus, there is some random element in warfare. For example, assume that two states are bargaining over territory. Each has some "reservation price," which is the amount that it must be offered (in bargaining) to make the bargain better than the war. For example, if a state values a territory at $50, but war will cost $30, then it will accept any bargain that leaves it with at least $30. Assume at least one state has an incentive to bluff about its reservation price:
Study what creates uncertainty and what doesn't. This might bring you towards domestic politics (e.g. democracies are more open, so there's less uncertainty when dealing with them; also, ideology, bureaucratic procedures, and so forth might help reduce uncertainty). But we still can't eliminate the uncertainty, we can only reduce it.
Research on similar subjects
Gartzke, Eric (author) • International Relations • War • Uncertainty • Intentions • Perception • Bargaining • Information
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