Summaries tagged Voting

• Abramowitz and Saunders: Ideological realignment in the American electorate
• Abramowitz and Segal: Beyond Willie Horton and the Pledge of Allegiance
• Abramowitz and Segal: Beyond Willie Horton and the Pledge of Allegiance
• Abramowitz and Segal: Beyond Willie Horton and the Pledge of Allegiance
• Abramson, Aldrich, Paolino, and Rohde: 'Sophisticated' voting in the 1988 presidential primaries
• Ackerman and Fishkin: Deliberation day
• Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida: Foreign affairs and issue voting
• Alesina and Rosenthal: Partisan cycles in Congressional elections and the macroeconomy
• Ansolabehere and Jones: Constituents' Responses to Congressional Roll-Call Voting
• Ansolabehere and Konisky: The introduction of voter registration and its effect on turnout
• Arceneaux and Nickerson: Who is Mobilized to Vote? A Re-Analysis of 11 Field Experiments
• Arceneaux: The federal face of voting
• Arneson: Democracy is not intrinsically just
• Arneson: Democracy is not intrinsically just
• Atkeson and Partin: Candidate Advertisemens, media coverage, and citizen attitudes
• Atkeson and Partin: Economic and referendum voting
• Atkeson and Partin: Economic and referendum voting
• Atkeson and Partin: Economic and referendum voting and the problem of data choice
• Balz: Ready to Lead on Day One: Predicting Presidential Greatness from Political Experience
• Baron: Political action versus voluntarism in social dilemmas and aid for the needy
• Bartels: Partisanship and voting behavior, 1952-1996
• Basinger and Lavine: Ambivalence, information, and electoral chioce
• Basinger and Lavine: Ambivalence, information, and electoral chioce
• Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee: Voting
• Bhavnani: Do Electoral Quotas Work after They Are Withdrawn? Evidence from a Natural Experiment in India
• Blais: To vote or note to vote
• Brady, Verba, and Schlozman: Beyond SES
• Braham and Holler: Distributing causal responsibility in collectives
• Brennan and Hamlin: Democratic devices and desires
• Brennan and Lomasky: Democracy and decision
• Brodsky and Thompson: Ethos, public choice, and referendum voting
• Bryan et al: Motivating Voter Turnout by Invoking the Self
• Burnham: Critical elections and the mainsprings of American politics
• Burnham: Party systems and the political process
• Burnham: The Current Crisis in American Politics
• Camerer and Fehr: When does 'economic man' dominate social behavior
• Campbell, Green, and Layman: The Party Faithful: Partisan Images, Candidate Religion, and the Electoral Impact of Party Identification
• Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes: The American voter
• Carsey and Wright: State and national factors in gubernatorial and senatorial elections
• Carson et al: The Electoral Costs of Party Loyalty in Congress
• Chandra: Why ethnic parties succeed
• Chong, Citrin, and Conley: When self-interest matters
• Chubb: Institutions, the economy, and the dynamics of state elections
• Chubb: Institutions, the economy, and the dynamics of state elections
• Chubb: Institutions, the economy, and the dynamics of state elections
• Clinton and Lapinski: "Targeted" advertising and voter turnout
• Coate and Conlin: A group rule-utilitarian approach to voter turnout
• Coate, Conlin, and Moro: The performance of the pivotal-voter model in small-scale elections
• Conradt and Roper: Consensus decision making in animals
• Converse: The nature of belief systems in mass publics
• Cook and Gronke: The skeptical American
• Cox: Making votes count
• Crew and Weiher: Gubernatorial popularity in three states
• Crew and Weiher: Gubernatorial popularity in three states
• Crisp, Moreno, and Shugart: The accountability deficit in Latin America
• Dalton and Wattenberg: Parties without partisans
• Davenport: Public Accountability and Political Participation: Effects of Face-to-Face Feedback Intervention on Voter Turnout of Public Housing Residents
• Denny and Doyle: Does Voting History Matter? Analysing Persistence in Turnout
• Dewan and Myatt: The Declining Talent Pool of Government
• Dickson and Scheve: Social identity, political speech, and electoral competition
• Dowding: Is it rational to vote
• Downs: An economic theory of democracy
• Druckman, Kifer, and Parkin: Campaign Communications in U.S. Congressional Elections
• Dubner and Levitt: Why vote
• Ebeid and Rodden: Economic geography and economic voting
• Ebeid and Rodden: Economic geography and economic voting
• Ebeid and Rodden: Economic geography and economic voting
• Edlin, Gelman, and Kaplan: Voting as a rational choice
• Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson: What moves macropartisanship
• Estlund: Beyond fairness and deliberation
• Estlund: Beyond fairness and deliberation
• Feddersen and Sandroni: A theory of participation in elections
• Feddersen, Gailmard, and Sandroni: Moral Bias in Large Elections: Theory and Experimental Evidence
• Feddersen: Rational choice theory and the paradox of not voting
• Ferejohn: Incumbent performance and electoral control
• Ferree: Explaining South Africa's racial census
• Finkel and Muller: Rational choice and the dynamics of collective political action
• Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope: The 2000 US Presidential election
• Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope: The 2000 US Presidential election
• Fiorina: Parties and partisanship
• Fiorina: Parties and partisanship
• Fiorina: Retrospective Voting in American Elections
• Fowler: Altruism and turnout
• Fowler: Habitual voting and behavioral turnout
• Fowler: Turnout in a small world
• Franklin: Voter turnout and the dynamics of electoral competition in established democracies since 1945
• Frey and Stutzer: Beyond outcomes
• Frey and Stutzer: Beyond outcomes
• Funk and Garcia-Monet: The relationship between personal and national concerns in public perceptions about the economy
• Funk: The dual influence of self-interest and societal interest in public opinion
• Geisler: Fair
• Gerber and Green: Do phone calls increase voter turnout
• Gerber and Green: Rational learning and partisan attitudes
• Gerber et al: Personality and Political Attitudes: Relationships across Issue Domains and Political Contexts
• Gerber, Green, and Larimer: An Experiment Testing the Relative Effectiveness of Encouraging Voter Participation by Inducing Feelings of Pride or Shame
• Gerber, Green, and Larimer: Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment
• Gerber, Green, and Shachar: Voting may be habit-forming
• Geys: 'Rational' theories of voter turnout
• Geys: Explaining voter turnout
• Goldman: A causal responsibility approach to voting
• Goodin and Roberts: The ethical voter
• Gordon, Huber, and Landa: Challenger entry and voter learning
• Gordon, Huber, and Landa: Challenger entry and voter learning
• Grafstein: An evidential decision theory of turnout
• Green and Gerber: Introduction to Social Pressure and Voting: New Experimental Evidence
• Green and Shachar: Habit formation and political behaviour
• Guth, Kellstedt, Smidt, and Green: Religious mobilization in the 2004 presidential election
• Hetherington: The effect of political trust on the presidential vote, 1968-96
• Hillygus and Jackman: Voter decision making in election 2000
• Holt and Smith: A selective survey of experiments in political science
• Hyde: Can international election observers deter fraud
• Jacobson: Polarized politics and the 2004 Congressional and presidential elections
• Jacobson: Strategic politicians and the dynamics of House elections, 1946-1986
• Jacobson: The politics of Congressional elections
• Jankowski: Altruism and the decision to vote
• Jankowski: Buying a lottery ticket to help the poor
• Johnston, Hagen, and Jamieson: Dynamics of the 2000 presidential campaign
• Jones: Partisan Polarization and Congressional Accountability in House Elections
• Kanazawa: A new solution to the collective action problem
• Kenney: The effect of state economic conditions on the vote for governor
• Kenney: The effect of state economic conditions on the vote for governor
• Kenney: The effect of state economic conditions on the vote for governor
• Kernell: Presidential popularity and negative voting
• Key: A theory of critical elections
• Key: The responsible electorate
• Kinder and Kiewiet: Sociotropic politics
• Kirchgaessner and Schulz: Expected closeness or mobilisation
• Larocca and Klemanski: U.S. State Election Reform and Turnout in Presidential Elections
• Lehoucq and Molina: Stuffing the ballot box
• Leighley: Group membership and the mobilization of political participation
• Leyden and Borrelli: The effect of state economic conditions on gubernatorial elections
• List and Goodin: Epistemic democracy
• List and Goodin: Epistemic democracy
• Lupia and McCubbins: The Democratic Dilemma
• Lupia, Levine, Menning, and Sin: Were Bush tax cut supporters simply ignorant
• Lupia, Levine, Menning, and Sin: Were Bush tax cut supporters simply ignorant
• Lupia: Busy voters, agenda control, and the power of information
• MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson: Macropartisanship
• Mann: Is There Backlash to Social Pressure? A Large-scale Field Experiment on Voter Mobilization
• Masket: No Middle Ground: How Informal Party Organizations Control Nominations and Polarize Legislatures
• Mayhew: Electoral realignments
• McDonald and Popkin: The myth of the vanishing voter
• Meehl: The selfish voter paradox and the thrown-away vote argument
• Meehl: The selfish voter paradox and the thrown-away vote argument
• Meltzer and Richards: A rational theory of the size of government
• Merrill, Grofman, and Brunell: Cycles in American National Electoral Politics, 1854-2006: Statistical Evidence and an Explanatory Model
• Miller, Krosnick, and Fabrigar: The origins of policy issue salience
• Miller, Krosnick, and Fabrigar: The origins of policy issue salience
• Mondak et al: Personality and Civic Engagement: An Integrative Framework for the Study of Trait Effects on Political Behavior
• Mueller: Public Choice III
• Mughan and Lacy: Economic performance, job insecurity, and electoral choice
• Mughan and Lacy: Economic performance, job insecurity, and electoral choice
• Nichter: Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot
• Nickerson: Is Voting Contagious? Evidence from Two Field Experiments
• Nie et al: The World Wide Web and the U.S. Political News Market
• Niemi and Jennings: Issues and inheritance in the formation of party identification
• Niemi, Stanley, and Vogel: State economies and state taxes
• Niemi, Stanley, and Vogel: State economies and state taxes
• Niemi, Stanley, and Vogel: State economies and state taxes
• Norris: Democratic Phoenix
• Opp: Why do people vote
• Palfrey: Laboratory experiments in political economy
• Panagopoulos: Timing is Everything? Primacy and Recency Effects in Voter Mobilization Campaigns
• Parfit: Reasons and persons
• Peltzman: Economic conditions and gubernatorial elections
• Peltzman: Economic conditions and gubernatorial elections
• Peltzman: Economic conditions and gubernatorial elections
• Popkin, Gorman, Phillips, and Smith: Comment
• Popkin, Gorman, Phillips, and Smith: Comment
• Popkin: The reasoning voter
• Posner: Institutions and ethnic politics in Africa
• Powell: Elections as instruments of democracy
• Prins: Ecology and behavior of the African buffalo
• Quattrone and Tversky: Causal versus diagnostic contingencies
• Quattrone and Tversky: Contrasting rational and psychological analyses of political choice
• Riker and Ordeshook: A theory of the calculus of voting
• Rosenstone and Hansen: Mobilization, participation, and American democracy
• Rudolph: Who's responsible for the economy
• Rudolph: Who's responsible for the economy
• Rudolph: Who's responsible for the economy
• Samuels: Concurrent elections, discordant results
• Schlozman, Verba, and Brady: Participation's not a paradox
• Sears and Funk: The limited effect of economic self-interest on the political attitudes of the mass public
• Shabman and Stephenson: A critique of the self-interested voter model
• Sondheimer and Green: Using Experiments to Estimate the Effects of Education on Voter Turnout
• Squire: Challenger profile and gubernatorial elections
• Stapel and Schwarz: The Republican who did not want to become president
• Stein: Economic voting for governor and U.S. Senator
• Stein: Economic voting for governor and U.S. Senator
• Tavits: The development of stable party support
• Thompson: Just elections
• Thompson: Just elections
• Thompson: Moral responsibility of public officials
• Tompkins: Have gubernatorial elections become more distinctive contests
• Tomz and Van Houweling: Candidate Positioning and Voter Choice
• Tsebelis: Nested games
• Turett: The vulnerability of American governors, 1900-1969
• Verba and Nie: Participation in America
• Verba, Schlozman, Brady, and Nie: Citizen activity
• Waldron: Law and disagreement
• Waldron: Law and disagreement
• Wantchekon: Clientelism and voting behavior
• Westlye: Senate elections and campaign intensity
• Wolfinger and Rosenstone: Who votes
• Wright: Causation in tort law
• Zaller: Monica Lewinsky's contribution to political science
• Zaller: Monica Lewinsky's contribution to political science