Summaries tagged Origins of Institutions

• Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson: The colonial origins of comparative development
• Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson: The colonial origins of comparative development
• Akerlof: The market for lemons
• Akerlof: The market for lemons
• Asher: The learning of legislative norms
• Bermeo: Ordinary people in extraordinary times
• Bermeo: Ordinary people in extraordinary times
• Boix: Setting the rules of the game
• Boix: Setting the rules of the game
• Bratton and Van de Walle: Democratic experiments in Africa
• Bratton and Van de Walle: Democratic experiments in Africa
• Cox: The Efficient Secret
• Cox: The Efficient Secret
• Dahl: Preface to democratic theory
• Dahl: The behavioral approach in political science
• Eaton: Can politicians control bureaucrats
• Geddes: What do we know about democratization after 20 years
• Geddes: What do we know about democratization after 20 years
• Gourevitch: The governance problem in international relations
• Gourevitch: The governance problem in international relations
• Gourevitch: The governance problem in international relations
• Greif: Self-enforcing political systems and economic growth
• Greif: Self-enforcing political systems and economic growth
• Hamilton, Jay, and Madison: The Federalist
• Hardin: Economic theories of the state
• Hardin: Economic theories of the state
• Holmes: Precommitment and the paradox of democracy
• Huber: Delegation to civil servants in parliamentary democracies
• Huber: Delegation to civil servants in parliamentary democracies
• Kahler: Evolution, choice, and international change
• Kahler: Evolution, choice, and international change
• Keohane: After hegemony
• Keohane: After hegemony
• Keohane: After hegemony
• Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal: The rational design of international institutions
• Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal: The rational design of international institutions
• Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal: The rational design of international institutions
• La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Pop Eleches, and Shleifer: Judicial Checks and Balances
• La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Pop Eleches, and Shleifer: Judicial Checks and Balances
• Libecap: Economic variables and the development of the law
• Libecap: Economic variables and the development of the law
• Lindblom: The intelligence of democracy
• Luebbert: Social foundations of political order in interwar Europe
• Luebbert: Social foundations of political order in interwar Europe
• March and Olson: Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions
• Martin and Simmons: Theories and empirical studies of international institutions
• Martin and Simmons: Theories and empirical studies of international institutions
• Martin and Simmons: Theories and empirical studies of international institutions
• Matthews: The folkways of the Senate
• McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast: Administrative procedures as instruments of political control
• McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast: Administrative procedures as instruments of political control
• McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast: Structure and process, politics and policy
• Meltzer and Richards: A rational theory of the size of government
• Meltzer and Richards: A rational theory of the size of government
• Milgrom, North, and Weingast: The role of institutions in the revival of trade
• Milgrom, North, and Weingast: The role of institutions in the revival of trade
• Miller: Pluralism and social choice
• Moe: Interests, institutions, and positive theory
• Moe: Political institutions
• Moe: Power and Political Institutions
• Moe: The politics of bureaucratic structure
• Moe: The politics of bureaucratic structure
• Moe: The politics of structural choice
• Moe: The politics of structural choice
• Moravcsik: The origins of human rights regimes
• Moravcsik: The origins of human rights regimes
• Olson: The logic of collective action
• Olson: The logic of collective action
• Ostrom: Governing the commons
• Ostrom: Governing the commons
• Popkin: Public choice and rural development
• Popkin: Public choice and rural development
• Przeworski: Democracy and the market
• Przeworski: Democracy and the market
• Russett and Oneal: Triangulating peace
• Russett and Oneal: Triangulating peace
• Schattschneider: The semisovereign people
• Shepsle: Studying Institutions
• Shugart and Carey: Presidents and Assemblies
• Sinclair: Multiple paths
• Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth: Structuring Politics
• Weingast and Marshall: The industrial organization of Congress
• Weingast and Marshall: The industrial organization of Congress
• Weisberg, Heberlig, and Campoli: Classics in Congressional politics
• Weisberg, Heberlig, and Campoli: Classics in Congressional politics
• Williamson: The economics of organization
• Williamson: The economics of organization
• Wilson: Congressional government
• Wood: The creation of the American republic