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Olson: The logic of collective action

Disclaimer. Don't rely on these old notes in lieu of reading the literature, but they can jog your memory. As a grad student long ago, my peers and I collaborated to write and exchange summaries of political science research. I posted them to a wiki-style website. "Wikisum" is now dead but archived here. I cannot vouch for these notes' accuracy, nor can I even say who wrote them. If you have more recent summaries to add to this collection, send them my way I guess. Sorry for the ads; they cover the costs of keeping this online.

Olson. 1965. The logic of collective action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

In Brief

Olson lays out his general theory in chapter 1, where he discusses individual rationality, selective incentives, and so on.

Three kinds of groups

  1. Privileged groups (members of this group would gain more from a public good than it would cost them to provide it unilaterally);
  2. Latent groups (any member of this group could withhold his contribution to the public good without causing a noticeable reduction in its supply); and
  3. Intermediate groups (if any member of this group withholds his contribution, it will cause a noticeable decrease in supply of the good, or a noticeable rise in cost to other contributors).

Variables and hypotheses

Y = common goods provision; X = group size

Why large groups have problems

Large groups have problems providing common goods for three reasons:

  1. each group member has a lower share of the benefits;
  2. so it's less likely that anybody's benefits of helping provide the good exceed the costs;
  3. and organizational costs rise with group size.

Exclusive vs inclusive goods

There are two kinds of common goods: exclusive and inclusive. With exclusive common goods, the supply is limited. Think of a cartel; each firm wants to increase output (to increase its profits), but if all firms do this, the profits disappear (as the price falls). The supply of profits is limited, so it is an exclusive good. With inclusive goods, however, supply is not limited. Whether more members are welcome depends on whether the good is exclusive or inclusive. Firms prefer to have few competitors because goods are exclusive; unions prefer to maximize membership because its goods are inclusive, and having more members spreads the costs around more.

Group Size and Group Behavior


Orthodox Theories of State and Class

In chapter 4, Olson applies his theory of collection action to a review of what he calls "orthodox theories." Although he starts by looking elsewhere, the chapter rapidly becomes a review of Marxism. Marx was often criticized for placing too much emphasis on self-interest (in his view, ideology, religion, and everything else were just veiled ways for one class to express its wealth-maximizing interests). The state was the means by which one class could oppress another. What Marx missed, however, was that the rational individuals he envisioned would not have an incentive to participate in the class revolts he predicted. Lenin appears to have understood the problem; in "What is to be Done," Lenin argued that communists would need to be led by a committed, disciplined, self-sacrificing minority.

Olson does point out that in some cases group behavior might be prompted by irrational causes (108). Perhaps later works by Horowitz and Gurr fit into this field.


Research by the same authors

Research on similar subjects

Tags

Olson, Mancur (author)Political ScienceEconomicsCollective ActionInstitutionsOrigins of InstitutionsStructure of Interests in Society

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