Adam R Brown
About
Bio and contact
CV (pdf)
Google Scholar profile
Teaching
Winter 2025: Poli 397/399r
Poli 397/399r syllabus
Assignments
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Fall 2024: Poli 110
Poli 110 syllabus
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Calendar
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Slides
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Other information
Utah Legislature internship
Washington Seminar
Letter of rec instructions
Research
My publications
Vita (pdf)
Google Scholar profile
Utah politics data and charts
The Utah Constitution over time (beta)
The Utah Legislature (bill stats, ideology, rankings, etc)
Book:
The Dead Hand's Grip: How Long Constitutions Bind States
Book:
Utah Politics and Government
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Subject index
Summaries tagged
Economics
Alchian and Demsetz: Production, information costs, and economic organization
Alchian and Demsetz: Property Right Paradigm
Barro and Gordon: Rules, discretion, and reputation in a model of monetary policy
Bates: Markets and states in tropical Africa
Becker: A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence
Coase: The lighthouse in economics
Coase: The nature of the firm
Coase: The problem of social cost
Demsetz: Toward a theory of property rights
Drazen: Political economy in macroeconomics
Drazen: The political business cycle after 25 years
Dubner and Levitt: Why vote
Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast: Coordination, commitment, and enforcement
Greif: Cultural beliefs and the organization of society
Hardin: Economic theories of the state
Hardin: Efficiency
Hardin: The tragedy of the commons
Hart: Incomplete contracts and the theory of the firm
Hibbs: Political parties and macroeconomic policy
Klein: Fisher-General Motors and the nature of the firm
Krueger: The political economy of rent-seeking
Libecap: Economic variables and the development of the law
McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast: Administrative procedures as instruments of political control
Meltzer and Richards: A rational theory of the size of government
Milgrom and Roberts: Bargaining costs, influence activities, and the organization of economic activity
Milgrom, North, and Weingast: The role of institutions in the revival of trade
Moe: The politics of structural choice
Niskanen: Bureaucrats and politicians
Noll: Economics perspectives on the politics of regulation
Nordhaus: The political business cycle
Olson: Power and prosperity
Olson: The logic of collective action
Ostrom: Governing the commons
Peltzman: Toward a more general theory of regulation
Root: Tying the King's hands
Shleifer and Vishny: Corruption
Smith: Constructivist and ecological rationality in economics
Stevens: The economics of collective choice
Stigler: The theory of economic regulation
Tiebout: A pure theory of local expenditures
Tullock: The costs of special privilege
Varian: Intermediate microeconomics
Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington: Economics of Regulation and Antitrust
Weingast and Marshall: The industrial organization of Congress
Williamson: The economics of organization