Principal-Agent -- Adam Brown, BYU Political Science

About
Teaching
- Winter 2025: Poli 397/399r
- Poli 397/399r syllabus
- Assignments
- Calendar view
- Check grades
- (See syllabus footer menu for more)
- Fall 2024: Poli 110
- Poli 110 syllabus
- Assignments
- Calendar
- Check grades
- Slides
- (See syllabus footer menu for more)
- Other information
- Utah Legislature internship
- Washington Seminar
- Letter of rec instructions
Research
- My publications
- Vita (pdf)
- Google Scholar profile
- Utah politics data and charts
- The Utah Constitution over time (beta)
- The Utah Legislature (bill stats, ideology, rankings, etc)
- Book: The Dead Hand's Grip: How Long Constitutions Bind States
- Book: Utah Politics and Government
Log in
- Log in

Notes navigation: Browse by title • Browse by author • Subject index

Summaries tagged Principal-Agent

Akerlof: The market for lemons
Bawn: Political control versus expertise
Crisp, Moreno, and Shugart: The accountability deficit in Latin America
De Figueiredo, Spiller, and Urbiztondo: An informational perspective on adminsitrative procedures
Downs: Inside bureaucracy
Epstein and O'Halloran: Administrative procedures, information, and agency discretion
Epstein and O'Halloran: Delegating Powers
Fama: Agency problems and the theory of the firm
Ferejohn and Shipan: Congressional influence on administrative agencies
Ferejohn: Incumbent performance and electoral control
Geddes: Politician's Dilemma
Hart: Incomplete contracts and the theory of the firm
Heclo: A government of strangers
Huber and Lupia: Cabinet instability and delegation in parliamentary democracies
Huber: Delegation to civil servants in parliamentary democracies
Kiewiet and McCubbins: The Logic of Delegation
Lowi: The end of liberalism
Lupia and McCubbins: The Democratic Dilemma
McCubbins and Schwartz: Congressional oversight overlooked
McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast: Administrative procedures as instruments of political control
Moe: Congressional Controls of the Bureaucracy
Moe: The politics of bureaucratic structure
Muller and Strom: Policy, office, or votes
Niskanen: Bureaucrats and politicians
Popkin: Public choice and rural development
Ramseyer and Rosenbluth: Japan's political marketplace
Rogowski: Institutions as constraints on strategic choice
Shleifer and Vishny: Corruption
Strom: Agency and Parliamentary Democracy
Strom: Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies
Thies: Keeping tabs on partners
Varian: Intermediate microeconomics
Volden: A formal model of the politics of delegation in a separation of powers system

All material ©2005-2024 unless noted. Featuring glorious hand-coded PHP and XHTML/CSS.

This portion of my website (/notes/) is the site formerly known as wikisum.com. Many years ago, my friends in graduate school and I would routinely share our reading notes with one another. We all read each article, but we crowdsourced the responsibility of summarizing our readings. When we were preparing for our comprehensive exams, I collected many of these summaries from peers and imported them into a wiki (wikisummary, or wikisum), hoping it would take off and attract hordes of graduate students and political scientists interested in maintaining an up-to-date knowledge base of all political science has to offer. It turns out I was too optimistic. Hundreds of people read the summaries, but almost nobody contributed new ones. Eventually, I quit renewing the wikisum domain and converted the contents into this static website. The summaries grow more dated each year, but since they might still have some use, they're still here—even if the name "wikisum" has become a bit of a misnomer. Enjoy.