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Shipan: Regulatory regimes, agency actions and the conditional nature of political influence

Disclaimer. Don't rely on these old notes in lieu of reading the literature, but they can jog your memory. As a grad student long ago, my peers and I collaborated to write and exchange summaries of political science research. I posted them to a wiki-style website. "Wikisum" is now dead but archived here. I cannot vouch for these notes' accuracy, nor can I even say who wrote them. If you have more recent summaries to add to this collection, send them my way I guess. Sorry for the ads; they cover the costs of keeping this online.

Shipan. 2004. Regulatory regimes, agency actions and the conditional nature of political influence. APRS.

In Brief

The literature has found conflicting results as to whether agencies are responsive to the current Congress. (Current Congress--so we're not worried about APAs and agency structure here.) Shipan uses a spatial model to show that reponsiveness depends on the alignment of preferences ("regime") among the agency, committee, and Congress.

The Game

Players

Order of Play

  1. Agency proposes an action, 'a'
  2. Committee either "gatekeeps" (takes no action) or passes a bill.
  3. If committee passes a bill, then floor hears it with an open rule and amends it to match its ideal point.

Spatial Model

Regimes

Committee-Floor Regime

Gatekeeping Regime

Floor Regime

President's Role

Bicameralism

Doesn't really change anything.

Data

Examines the FDA over several decades.

Findings

Concerns

Research by the same authors

Research on similar subjects

Tags

Shipan, Charles (author)Political ScienceAmerican PoliticsBureaucracyResponsiveness

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