Summaries tagged Congress (U.S.)

• Aldrich: Why parties
• Alesina and Rosenthal: Partisan cycles in Congressional elections and the macroeconomy
• Arnold: The logic of Congressional action
• Asher: The learning of legislative norms
• Battista: Formal and Perceived Leadership Power in U.S. State Legislatures
• Binder: The partisan basis of procedural choice
• Cameron: Veto bargaining
• Carson, Engstrom, and Roberts: Candidate quality, the personal vote, and the incumbency advantage in Congress
• Cox and Katz: Why did the incumbency advantage in U.S. House elections grow
• Cox and McCubbins: Legislative leviathan
• Cox and McCubbins: Setting the agenda
• Cox and McCubbins: Toward a theory of legislative rules changes
• Engstrom and Kernell: Manufactured responsiveness
• Fenno: Homestyle
• Fenno: U.S. House members in their constituencies
• Fiorina: Some problems in studying the effects of resource allocation in Congressional elections
• Fiorina: The case of the vanishing marginals
• Gordon, Huber, and Landa: Challenger entry and voter learning
• Jacobson and Kernell: Strategy and choice in Congressional elections
• Jacobson: Polarized politics and the 2004 Congressional and presidential elections
• Jacobson: Strategic politicians and the dynamics of House elections, 1946-1986
• Jacobson: The electoral origins of divided government
• Jacobson: The marginals never vanished
• Jacobson: The politics of Congressional elections
• Johannes and McAdams: The Congressional incumbency effect
• Kernell and McDonald: Congress and American political development
• Kernell: Presidential popularity and negative voting
• Kiewiet and McCubbins: Appropriations decisions as a bilateral bargaining game between president and Congress
• Krehbiel: Pivotal politics
• Krehbiel: Where's the party
• Matthews: The folkways of the Senate
• Matthews: Veto threats
• Mayhew: Congress
• Mayhew: Congressional elections
• McAdams and Johannes: Does casework matter
• McCarty and Groseclose: The politics of blame
• McCarty: Proposal rights, veto rights, and political bargaining
• McCubbins and Schwartz: Congressional oversight overlooked
• Miller and Stokes: Constituency influence in Congress
• Moe: The politics of structural choice
• Niskanen: Bureaucrats and politicians
• Polsby: The institutionalization of the US House of Representatives
• Roberts: Political institutions, policy expectations, and the 1980 elections
• Rohde: Parties and leaders in the post-reform House
• Rohde: Risk bearing and progressive ambition
• Schickler and Rich: Controlling the floor
• Schickler and Rich: Party government in the House reconsidered
• Scholz and Wood: Controlling the IRS
• Sinclair: Multiple paths
• Weingast and Marshall: The industrial organization of Congress
• Weingast and Moran: Bureaucratic discretion or Congressional control
• Weisberg, Heberlig, and Campoli: Classics in Congressional politics
• Westlye: Senate elections and campaign intensity
• Wilson: Congressional government
• Wood: Principals, bureaucrats, and responsiveness in Clean Air enforcements