Disclaimer. Don't rely on these old notes in lieu of reading the literature, but they can jog your memory. As a grad student long ago, my peers and I collaborated to write and exchange summaries of political science research. I posted them to a wiki-style website. "Wikisum" is now dead but archived here. I cannot vouch for these notes' accuracy, nor can I even say who wrote them. If you have more recent summaries to add to this collection, send them my way I guess. Sorry for the ads; they cover the costs of keeping this online.
Ingberman and Yao. 1991. Presidential commitment and the veto. AJPS.
The authors argue that by committing to a particular policy stance (i.e. no new taxes) the president can use the veto to improve the utility he receives from the eventual policy outcome. The President is able to commit himself to a particular veto by publicizing his position, which creates a cost if he does not follow through with the veto, and forces the legislature to consider his policy preference. The President may also be able to improve his utility by vetoing a piece of legislation that is overridden by Congress, because to override the veto Congress may change its policy in a way that moves the final policy closer to the president's preferred policy.
Similar to other veto models (Romer and Rosenthal 1978, Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991) in that they are trying to determine the institutional sources of presidential power. They contrast themselves with Kernell's (1986) Going Public argument because in their view the purpose of a veto threat is not to change the preferences of congressmen, which is how they read Kernell, it is to make a costly commitment.
Research on similar subjects