State Politics & Policy Quarterly
12(2) 183–203

DOI: 10.1177/1532440012442911
http://sppq.sagepub.com

The Item Veto's Sting

Adam R. Brown[1]

Abstract

Despite lofty expectations from the item veto's proponents (and fears from its opponents), formal models have suggested that the item veto is unlikely to have much effect beyond what a full veto could render. However, I show that different findings obtain when item vetoes are appreciated more fully as a dimensionality-reducing institution. I begin by developing a package veto model in a generalized multidimensional space. I then show how introducing the item veto changes the outcome by forcing veto bargaining into what is essentially a unidimensional space. As a result, executives with an item veto or other dimensionality-reducing institution (such as a single-subject rule) can be far more powerful in legislative bargaining than executives who lack these tools, other things being equal. I use simulations to demonstrate the model's main implications.

Keywords

executive politics, governors, legislative politics, legislative/executive interaction, veto

Perhaps the greatest differences between state politics and federal politics arise in the area of legislative-executive bargaining. Governors vary in their powers (Dometrius 1979; 1987), and legislatures vary in their resources (Mooney 2009; Squire 1992; 2007), creating a bargaining context very different from the presidential-congressional context (Ferguson 2003). The rise of *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* as a journal dedicated to state politics has helped political scientists begin to understand these state-level institutional innovations far better than they once did. It is less true today than a decade ago that "the field has been particularly weak in building theory" (Clucas 2003, 387).

The item veto, found in 44 states (Wall 2008, 185–6), remains one of the most intriguing institutional variations. Studies of the item veto's empirical effects have used a variety of useful approaches, including surveys of political insiders (Abney and

[1]Brigham Young University, UT, USA

Corresponding Author:
Adam R. Brown, Brigham Young University, 745 Kimball Tower, Provo, UT 84602
Email: brown@byu.edu

Lauth 1997; 1998) and close analysis of budget appropriations (Holtz-Eakin 1988; Nice 1988). Although studies of this sort have provided valuable empirical analysis, our theoretical understanding of the item veto remains underdeveloped. For theoretical support, discussion of the item veto often refers back to classic work by Carter and Schap (1987; 1990), among others (see also Dearden and Husted 1990; 1993; Dearden and Schap 1994). For a thorough review, see Schap (2006). However, Carter and Schap (1990) may have presented an overly constrained interpretation of their model. This article's reinterpretation of their model suggests that the item veto may have much more meaningful effects than we have heretofore supposed.

Perhaps the easiest way to understand models of the item veto is to begin with the simple, familiar model of the package veto presented by Kiewiet and McCubbins (1985; 1988). Using spatial logic, Kiewiet and McCubbins found that the veto was a conditional tool; it enabled the executive to limit policy change, but it did little to help the executive advance it.[1] Using a similar model, Carter and Schap (1990) argued that the item veto differs from the full veto only in "select settings." Even in those rare settings, they argued, the item veto's effect differs only slightly from the full veto's. This finding led to a memorable lament, the title of their 1990 article: "Line-item veto, where is thy sting?" This lament became the common wisdom among political scientists. Contrary to what the item veto's proponents (and even opponents) might expect (cf. De Figueiredo 2003), this common wisdom holds that the item veto has little effect.

As will be shown below, however, these lackluster findings about the item veto may arise from an incomplete appreciation of the role of dimensionality. In dealing with full vetoes, the Kiewiet–McCubbins model assumed that policy bargaining would occur in a simple unidimensional space—i.e., along a single liberal-conservative ideological continuum. This is a standard assumption in models of the full veto (e.g., Cameron 2001; Matthews 1989; but see Duggan, Kalandrakis, and Manjunath 2008). Models of the item veto often allow for greater dimensionality (e.g., Carter and Schap 1987; 1990; Dearden and Husted 1993; Indridason 2011). However, not all models have recognized the item veto's critically important role as a dimensionality-reducing institution. Those authors who have recognized this dimensionality-reducing role (such as Carter and Schap 1990) have underestimated its importance when interpreting their models.

As a result, existing models of the item veto have underestimated the item veto's potential effects. Governors endowed with an item veto have the power to force legislatures to break up a multidimensional omnibus bill into its constituent parts. The item veto's most important role, then, is to reduce dimensionality. To fully appreciate its effect, we must begin with a multidimensional model of veto bargaining and see how introducing the item veto changes the dimensionality.

I begin by extending the standard unidimensional model of (full) veto bargaining into a multidimensional space, so that an arbitrary number of orthogonal issues are considered in a single omnibus bill. As dimensionality increases, the model shows that veto bargaining increasingly favors the legislature at the executive's expense. Legislatures get more of what they want—and governors get less of what they



Figure 1. Three Unidimensional Bargaining Contexts

want—when legislatures can force governors to veto or accept a larger number of orthogonal issues at once in an omnibus bill. I then show that introducing an item veto weakens the legislature by removing these advantages, producing the same end result as unidimensional bargaining. Like Carter and Schap (1987; 1990), I find that the item veto's effect differs from the full veto's only in certain circumstances—but I use computer simulations to find that those circumstances may arise very frequently, rendering the item veto a potent weapon.

Traditional Models of the Full Veto

A basic model of the full veto can be derived from five simple assumptions. First, a unitary legislature proposes a change to the status quo, which a veto-wielding governor accepts or rejects. For convenience, I refer to these players as a feminine governor and a masculine legislature.[2] Second, players have symmetrical, single-peaked (i.e., Euclidean) preferences contingent only on policy outcomes. Third, players have complete information about each other's preferences and the location of the status quo. Fourth, the game has only two steps (proposal and veto) and is nonrepetitive. And fifth, all bargaining occurs within a unidimensional space. These are roughly the assumptions that Kiewiet and McCubbins (1985; 1988) used in their classic models of the full veto.

When these conditions obtain, the three situations shown in Figure 1 (and their redundant mirror images) depict all possible bargaining situations. For each issue i, G_i and L_i denote the locations of the governor's and legislature's respective ideal points, SQ_i denotes the status quo,[3] and P_i denotes the legislature's optimal proposal. Nature assigns the locations of G_i, L_i, and SQ_i. Point G_i' denotes the point that is exactly as far from G_i as SQ_i is but in the opposite direction. Given Euclidean preferences, the governor will veto any proposal that is further from G_i than SQ_i is; i.e., she will veto any proposal outside the dashed line delimited by SQ_i and G_i'. She will passively accept any proposal that is on or between SQ_i and G_i'.

With the governor's strategy known, we turn now to the legislature's equilibrium strategy. The legislature needs to position its proposal, P_i, such that (a) it is as close to L_i as possible (to ensure maximum utility gain) and (b) it is no further from G_i than SQ_i

is (to avoid a veto). With Issue 1, L_1 lies beyond G_1'. Rather than propose his ideal point and attract a veto, the legislature moderates his proposal so that the governor will be indifferent between it and the status quo. Thus, P_1 must rest exactly at G_1'. Call this situation "compromise," since the legislature compromises to avoid a veto. With Issue 2, L_2 lies within the veto-proof range delimited by SQ_2 and G_2'. The legislature can propose his exact ideal point without fear of a veto. Call this "legislative dominance," since P_2 rests exactly at L_2. With Issue 3, L_3 and G_3 rest on opposite sides of SQ_3, producing a stalemate. The legislature cannot move the status quo without either losing utility or attracting a veto. The legislature's "proposal" is simply the status quo.

Using unidimensional models like these, Kiewiet and McCubbins showed that the (full) veto is a conditional tool. It enables the governor to moderate the legislature's excesses (under "compromise" and "stalemate"), but it does not enable the governor to push the legislature further than it wants to go (as in "legislative dominance"). Moreover, the veto can work its magic without ever being used; with complete information, the legislature can always finesse its proposal so as to barely avoid a veto. The five assumptions listed above are sufficient to produce these findings, although later work has shown that not all five are necessary.[4] Nevertheless, I will retain all these assumptions except unidimensionality to keep my model as simple and straightforward as possible.

The Problem With Unidimensionality

Like many assumptions employed in quality research, the unidimensionality assumption is useful but not realistic. Bills are unidimensional only if they make changes to a single policy, such as the tobacco tax rate or the legality of partial-birth abortion. In reality, few interesting bills satisfy this condition. Consider President Gerald Ford's veto of HR 12384, which authorized $3.3 billion for military purposes. Although Ford had no major qualms with the bill's authorization level or general aims, he vetoed it over a relatively minor provision that would have required advance notification to Congress of proposed military base closings. With this provision, the bill touched on at least two distinct policy dimensions: Military funding and the congressional-executive balance of power. As Cameron (2001, 87) notes, "It was this provision, quite distinct from the dollar levels, that the president found objectionable." Responding to Ford's veto, Congress soon passed a nearly identical bill; spending levels remained unchanged, but the base closure clause was modified. Ford promptly signed it.

One can easily find other anecdotes where an executive considered vetoing an entire bill only because it included some relatively minor provisions unrelated to the bill's broader purposes. Like Ford, George W. Bush vetoed a defense authorization bill over a minor provision; like Ford, Bush later signed a nearly identical bill with the offending provision removed.[5] Reagan famously vetoed a 1987 highway bill because of its 152 pork projects, saying, "I haven't seen so much lard since I handed out blue ribbons at the Iowa State Fair." In all these situations, a president vetoed an otherwise acceptable bill as a result of unrelated provisions.

These anecdotes all involve an actual veto. One can also find anecdotes where a president accepted a bill despite reservations over certain provisions. George W. Bush frequently expressed his reservations in written "signing statements." For example, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (HR 2863) enacted guidelines for how the executive branch should treat terrorist suspects held at Guantanamo Bay; in a controversial signing statement, Bush instructed the executive branch to interpret the act

> in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief . . . , which will assist in achieving the shared objective of the Congress and the President . . . of protecting the American people from further terrorist attacks.

Bush issued hundreds of signing statements that raised objections to specific sections in the bills he signed. Richard Nixon's former White House counsel, John Dean (2006), observed that "Bush [was] using signing statements like line item vetoes." Although Bush's reliance on signing statements was new, his general dilemma was not. Like presidents before him, Bush routinely encountered bills that contained objectionable provisions orthogonal to other parts of the bill, creating a situation where the president would like to see certain provisions enacted and others redacted. Lacking an item veto but willing to see the overall bill enacted, Bush could do little more than sign the bill while venting his frustrations in a separate statement.

Let us return to the example of Gerald Ford and the base closure clause. If we were to consider Ford's decision in terms of Figure 1, it appears that Ford faced Issues 2 and 3 simultaneously. The overall military spending bill resembled Issue 2; Ford was happy to accept what Congress gave him for national defense, although he might have accepted even more. The base closure clause resembled Issue 3; Congress wanted to pull the legislative-executive balance of power in a direction that Ford found unacceptable. Because Ford confronted two distinct policy dimensions in the same bill, his veto bargaining with Congress occurred in a two-dimensional policy space, not a unidimensional one. Had Ford been endowed with an item veto, he could have handled each dimension separately by vetoing only the base closure clause (assuming that he were presented the same bill irrespective of the type of veto authority possessed).

At this point, it is worth clarifying what constitutes an issue "dimension." The fact that two issues appear unrelated—say, the tax rate on cigarettes versus funding to build a new freeway—does not necessarily mean that they represent different issue dimensions. In this example, both issues might provoke arguments about the appropriate size of government, whether on the taxation side or on the spending side. If so, then both issues are battles over the same underlying concern. But to the extent that they reflect different underlying concerns—concern about children's health (for tobacco taxes) versus concern about infrastructure and commerce (for the freeway)—the two issues do represent distinct underlying policy dimensions. Issue dimensions commonly encountered in American politics include hawkish versus dovish foreign policy, passive versus active governmental involvement in the economy, moral regulation versus

permissiveness (abortion, homosexuality), local versus centralized control (states' rights), passive versus active protection of the environment, punitive versus rehabilitative approaches to crime, and so on.[6] Being liberal on one of these dimensions does not logically require a person to also be liberal on the others.

When the simple unidimensional model is extended to the sort of multidimensional situation that Ford encountered, we find that legislatures can increase their influence over policy outcomes at the governor's expense by bundling issues together—especially if the governor lacks an item veto. To show that this is the case, we must consider two separate questions. First, we must consider each player's equilibrium strategies when any *n* issues are handled in a single (*n*-dimensional) bill. As this discussion will show, the item veto's effect differs from the full veto's only in certain circumstances, consistent with Carter and Schap's findings. This leads to the second question: How frequently do those circumstances arise? In contrast to Carter and Schap's conjecture, I find that these circumstances actually arise frequently.

Equilibrium Strategies in Multidimensional Bargaining

In the multidimensional game, G, L, SQ, and P have the same meaning as above, except that they are now defined as coordinate vectors in *n*-dimensional space, with *n* chosen by nature. For example, G is located at $(g_1, g_2, g_3, \ldots, g_n)$, L is located at $(l_1, l_2, l_3, \ldots, l_n)$, and so on. As before, nature assigns the locations of G, L, and SQ; the legislature chooses the *n*-dimensional coordinates of P, which the governor vetoes or accepts. Figure 2 shows three general variants of this game.[7] (Although the illustration uses only two dimensions, the logic given in text is general to arbitrary *n*.) Within each situation *i*, the governor is indifferent between SQ_i and any equidistant point, as represented by the circular indifference curve centered at G_i.

In each situation, the shaded rectangle shows the range of legislative proposals that the governor would accept under unidimensional bargaining. If issue X (the *x* axis) and issue Y (the *y* axis) were addressed separately, the governor would restrict movement on issue X to the range delimited by the rectangle's width, and she would restrict movement on issue Y to the range delimited by the rectangle's height. This is a straightforward application of the unidimensional models from Figure 1. In Figure 2's Situation 1, P_{1U} shows the cumulative result of separate (unidimensional) bargaining over these two issues. Observe that the legislature and governor stalemate on issue X, but on issue Y they agree to a large northward movement in the status quo, which produces an outcome (P_{1U}) much closer to both players' ideal points. Not coincidentally, P_{1U} lies on the edge of the shaded rectangle at the point closest to L_1. In higher dimensionality, the rectangle would be replaced by an *n*-dimensional hyperrectangle. But even in higher dimensionality, the cumulative result of unidimensional bargaining over each of the *n* issues would still be the point along the hyperrectangle's surface that is closest to the legislature's ideal point.

When issues X and Y are addressed simultaneously rather than separately, however, the shaded rectangle becomes irrelevant. Because the governor is indifferent between



Figure 2. Three Multidimensional Bargaining Contexts

the status quo and any equidistant point, the governor's indifference curve in each situation *i* is represented by the circle passing tangentially through SQ_i with G_i at the center. In higher dimensionality, the governor's indifference curve would be the surface of an *n*-sphere rather than the perimeter of a circle. A legislative proposal that is farther from G_i than SQ_i—i.e., a proposal outside this indifference curve—will attract a veto. A proposal within or along this curve will be allowed to pass into law.

With the governor's strategy known, the legislature's task in each situation *i* is to make a proposal as close to L_i as possible without provoking a veto. In Situation 1, L_1 lies just outside the governor's indifference curve. To prevent a veto, the legislature proposes P_{1M}, the closest point to L_1 that lies along the governor's indifference curve.[8] If the governor had an item veto, she could have vetoed portions of the proposal dealing with issue X, resulting in a new status quo along the edge of the dashed rectangle, barely south of P_{1U}. Of course, if the governor had an item veto, the legislature could have foreseen its use, proposing P_{1U} and ensuring his most favorable unidimensional outcome without attracting the governor's rebuke. The presence of an item veto, then,

leads the legislature to produce the same proposal (P_{1U}) that sequential unidimensional bargaining would produce, even when multiple issues are handled simultaneously. By contrast, the absence of an item veto empowers the legislature at the governor's expense, allowing the legislature to propose P_{1M} successfully. The item veto's effect is depicted by the distance between P_{1M} and P_{1U}. In Situation 1, the effect is large.

In Situation 2, L_2 lies entirely within the governor's indifference curve. Note, though, that L_2 lies outside the dashed rectangle. When issues X and Y are handled simultaneously, multidimensional bargaining enables the legislature to propose his exact ideal point, so that P_{2M} lies at L_2. If issues X and Y were handled separately, however, the legislature and governor would stalemate on issue X while the legislature would get its exact ideal point on issue Y, eventually resulting in the cumulative unidimensional outcome P_{2U}. Once again, observe that the governor could induce the legislature to propose the same outcome in multidimensional bargaining if she were empowered with an item veto. The item veto's effect is the difference between P_{2M} and P_{2U}. In Situation 2, the item veto's effect is modest.

Situation 3 depicts a two-dimensional stalemate, which occurs because SQ_3 lies exactly between G_3 and L_3. This configuration becomes extremely improbable as dimensionality rises. When this configuration does obtain, the governor's indifference curve will be exactly tangential to the legislature's indifference curve at the status quo. Whether issues X and Y are handled in sequential unidimensional bargaining or in a single multidimensional bill, the result will be an unchanged status quo.

Like the unidimensional game, then, the multidimensional game takes three general forms: compromise, legislative dominance, and stalemate. In Situation 3's stalemate, neither the full veto nor the item veto has any effect. In the other two situations, however, the item veto has clear potential to benefit the governor. In Situation 1's compromise, the full veto moderates the legislature's proposal to the edge of the governor's indifference curve (P_{1M}), but an item veto would moderate it further by forcing it to the edge of the dashed rectangle (P_{1U}). There is a large gap between P_{1M} and P_{1U}. Meanwhile, the item veto's effect is conditional in Situation 2. If L_2 were inside the rectangle, then neither the item veto nor the full veto would have any effect, with the legislature getting its exact ideal point either way. But because L_2 lies outside the dashed rectangle but within the circle, a full veto cannot prevent the legislature from getting its exact ideal point ($L_2 = P_{2M}$), whereas an item veto could force the legislature to settle for P_{2U}.

How Select Are the Circumstances?

Using somewhat different terminology, Carter and Schap (1990) also produced a similar theoretical result: The item veto's effect differs from the full veto's only in certain circumstances. In particular, the item veto's effect differs from the full veto's in Situation 1. In addition, it differs in Situation 2 if L lies outside the rectangle but inside the circle. More generally, the full veto will prevent policy from moving beyond the circle's perimeter, and the item veto will prevent policy from moving

beyond the dashed rectangle's perimeter. The potential effect of the item veto, then, depends on two conditions:

Condition 1: The circle must be much larger than the rectangle, so that there is a wide gap between the edge of the circle and the edge of the rectangle.
Condition 2: L must be located well outside the rectangle and in a direction that maximizes any gap between the rectangle's edge and the circle's.

The item veto's effect differs most from the full veto's when there is a large gap between the rectangle's edge and the circle's edge, and when L is located outside the circle at a maximal distance from the rectangle's edge. I readily acknowledge that Situation 1 in Figure 2 was contrived to show roughly this circumstance. After developing their own two-dimensional figure, which resembled Situation 1 in my Figure 2, Carter and Schap supposed that this particular circumstance would occur rarely at best. More often, they conjectured, the gap between the rectangle's edge and the circle's would be small, or L would not be positioned in such a way as to exploit any gap that may exist. If their conjecture were correct, then the item veto's potential impact would be small indeed.

As such, Carter and Schap concluded that line item vetoes lack "sting." However, formal models only tell us which conditions matter; they do not tell us how frequently conditions actually obtain in real life. In particular, consider Condition 2, given above, which says that item vetoes will differ in their effect from full vetoes only when the players' ideal points fall into certain configurations. Formal models can show this conditionality to be true, but they do not help us understand how often this condition is met in real life.

Unfortunately, it is difficult to measure how often these conditions obtain in real life, since we cannot observe the exact locations of politicians' ideal points. We often estimate legislators' ideal points based on roll call votes, but these roll call votes are an outcome of the very processes being modeled here.

Even if it is difficult to directly measure ideal points, however, there are ways of estimating how often the conditions listed above might arise in real life. To estimate this, I programmed a computer simulation. In each iteration of the simulation, the governor's and legislature's ideal points and the location of the status quo were randomly assigned an n-dimensional vector of coordinates. Each coordinate was an integer drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 100. In each iteration, the simulated legislature would attempt to propose a new policy that would maximize the legislature's utility gain while avoiding a veto by using the strategies defined above. I ran the simulation 100,000 times in 1 dimension, 100,000 times in 2 dimensions, and so on up to 10 dimensions, for a total of 1,000,000 distinct trials. (In the interest of space, I report only the first five dimensions here.[9])

The results are reported in Table 1, part A. In unidimensionality, 33.8% of the trials resulted in a stalemate situation where the legislature and governor could not agree on a new policy. Such stalemates did not generally occur in higher dimensionality.[10] As

Table 1. Simulated Executive-Legislative Bargaining Results

		Stalemate	Legislative Dominance			Compromise			Item Veto Effect	
Dims.	Trials	Frequency (%)	Frequency (%)	Gov Mean Utility Gain	Leg. Mean Utility Gain	Frequency (%)	Gov Mean Utility Gain	Leg. Mean Utility Gain	Gov's Mean Gain (%)	Leg.'s Mean Gain (%)
A. Basic simulation										
1	100,000	33.8	49.7	83.3	113.9	16.5	0.0	91.7	0	0
2	100,000	0.0	49.9	90.8	177.4	50.1	0.0	86.1	+38.4	−21.7
3	100,000	0.0	49.8	93.5	225.7	50.2	0.0	131.9	+68.8	−30.4
4	100,000	0.0	50.2	94.4	265.4	49.8	0.0	171.9	+94.7	−35.2
5	100,000	0.0	49.6	95.7	301.4	50.4	0.0	205.1	+116.8	−38.1
B. Governor vetoes when indifferent; bundling incurs a 10-unit transaction cost per issue dimension										
1	100,000	36.5	47.5	87.0	117.2	16.0	5.0	95.0	0	0
2	100,000	13.3	47.9	94.5	169.8	38.8	5.0	99.9	+34.7	−15.4
3	100,000	6.2	48.1	96.9	207.2	45.8	5.0	124.8	+62.9	−21.8
4	100,000	3.2	48.5	97.8	236.5	48.3	5.0	149.2	+87.4	−25.1
5	100,000	2.0	49.9	99.1	262.3	50.2	5.0	169.3	+108.2	−26.7
C. Ideal points drawn from DW-NOMINATE scores for the 90th Congress (1967–68)										
1	100,000	35.5	48.2	28.0	36.6	16.5	0.0	28.8	0	0
2	100,000	0.0	49.2	38.8	70.9	50.8	0.0	32.9	+36.0	−21.9
D. Ideal points drawn from DW-NOMINATE scores for the 111th Congress (2009–10)										
1	100,000	33.9	50.0	40.0	49.6	16.1	0.0	29.2	0	0
2	100,000	0.0	50.3	38.7	68.5	49.6	0.0	29.6	+34.2	−22.0

Note: In simulations A and B, the governor's and legislature's ideal points and the location of the status quo are *n*-dimensional points defined by a vector of integer coordinates drawn from a normal distribution *N* (0,100). In simulations C and D, ideal points are drawn randomly from the universe of DW-NOMINATE scores (rescaled to range from −100 to +100). See text for details. Dims. = Dimensions; Gov Mean Utility Gain = Governor's Mean Utility Gain; Leg. Mean Utility Gain = Legislature's Mean Utility Gain.

noted earlier, stalemates can occur only if the three assigned points (i.e., G, L, and SQ) lie in a perfectly straight line, with SQ in the middle. That alignment becomes extremely unlikely as dimensionality rises.

In unidimensionality, 49.7% of the trials found the legislature's ideal point within the governor's indifference curve, allowing the legislature to dominate the process and propose its exact ideal point. Although this outcome occurs at roughly the same frequency even as dimensionality rises, the legislature's utility gains from this outcome rise significantly with dimensionality. In unidimensionality, this outcome enabled the legislature to move the status quo an average of 113.9 utils (our units of distance) closer to its ideal point[11]; in two dimensions, the legislature moved the status quo an average of 177.4 utils closer; and with higher dimensionality, the legislature's utility gains continued to rise. By contrast, the governor's gains from bargaining in this situation were almost constant regardless of dimensionality. Clearly, increasing dimensionality benefits the legislature far more than the governor.

In unidimensionality, 16.5% of the trials resulted in a compromise—i.e., the legislature proposed a new status quo between the two players' ideal points. Compromise became far more common in multidimensionality, reflecting the drop in stalemates. The legislature's gains from compromise rise rapidly with dimensionality. In unidimensionality, these compromises brought policy an average of 91.7 utils closer to the legislature's ideal point. This average remains roughly constant in two dimensions, but it rises sharply with higher dimensionality.[12] By contrast, the governor gains nothing from compromise; because it is using the strategy derived above, the legislature "compromises" by moderating its demands so that the governor will be indifferent between the proposal and the status quo. This sort of compromise does not offer any utility gain to the governor.

The final two columns are an attempt to summarize the overall effects of the item veto in these simulations. (The preceding columns all assume that the governor has only a full veto.) The final two columns show each player's average gain from considering any *n* issues sequentially (i.e., unidimensionally) rather than bundling them into a single, multidimensional omnibus bill. I present these differences as percentages. If the governor would have gained 45 utils relative to the status quo through sequential (unidimensional) bargaining over two unrelated issues, but she gains only 30 utils relative to the status quo when those same issues are handled together, then multidimensional bundling has cost the governor 15 utils. If the governor had an item veto, she would have been able to undo the bundling and obtain the full 45 util gain. Because these utils are based on an arbitrary scale, it may be more intuitive to say that the governor's utility gain would have been 50% larger if she had an item veto.[13]

Because an item veto's function is to unbundle multidimensional bills into its constituent (unidimensional) parts, the final two columns show how the lack of an item veto influences each player's utility. In two dimensions, the governor's utility gain would be (on average) 38.4% larger if she had been able to use an item veto to force apart two issues randomly bundled into a single bill. Meanwhile, the item veto would



Figure 3. How Frequently an Item Veto Would Benefit the Governor

have lowered the legislature's utility gain by 21.7%. These are large, meaningful effects even in two dimensions. They grow much larger with higher dimensionality.

Of course, the averages in the two rightmost columns include a number of bargaining situations where the item veto's effect did not differ from the full veto's, which surely depresses these averages. Figure 3 explores the item veto's potential effect from a different angle by plotting how frequently the item veto had any effect at all. In other words, Figure 3 shows exactly how often Conditions 1 and 2 obtained in these simulations. In one dimension, the item veto never has any effect; this is not surprising because the item veto is a dimensionality-reducing institution. In two dimensions, the item veto benefits the governor 50.5% of the time. Sometimes the effect is large and sometimes it is small, but the governor would have been better off with an item veto in 50.5% of these trials. (In the remaining 49.5% of trials, the item veto would have had the same effect as the full veto.) When three randomly chosen issues are bundled together, an item veto would benefit the governor 75.3% of the time. These frequencies are extremely high. Even in only two or three dimensions, the item veto can make a difference more often than not. And as the rightmost columns of Table 1 show, this difference can often be large.

Robustness

As a robustness check, part B of Table 1 presents new simulations with two changes. First, in these simulations, the governor vetoes any proposal that does not grant her at least a five-unit increase in utility. This reflects Ingberman and Yao's (1991) contention that executives might be able to use public veto threats to extract modest concessions for themselves. Second, the legislature incurs a 10 util cost for each issue dimension that it bundles into a single bill, reflecting the internal transaction costs that

may rise with bill complexity.[14] Although these changes diverge somewhat from the spatial model given above, I present this variation to demonstrate the simulation's robustness to reasonable adjustments. Even with these modified parameters, the simulation still shows that an item veto could substantially boost a governor's utility gains from legislative bargaining. Likewise, other reasonable modifications of this simulation's parameters do not change this general finding.[15]

In the real world, of course, politicians do not randomly draw their ideal points from a normal distribution. As noted above, however, that is exactly how I have assigned ideal points in the preceding simulations. There are good reasons to model ideal points as random draws from a normal distribution. For one thing, this procedure allows me to run hundreds of thousands of simulations with arbitrarily high dimensionality. At the same time, there are reasons to worry about this procedure. After all, real politicians' ideal points may be constrained by partisanship and ideology into a more bimodal distribution.

As a more fundamental robustness check, I also ran simulations that draw ideal points from the universe of DW-NOMINATE scores. Despite their imperfections, DW-NOMINATE scores remain the reigning method of estimating politicians' ideal points. I obtained common space DW-NOMINATE scores for every member of the 90th and 111th Congresses, including both the House and the Senate.[16] Each member of Congress has scores in two dimensions. The first dimension captures liberal-conservative disagreements over governmental intervention in the economy; scores in this dimension have a bimodal distribution reflecting Republican and Democratic disagreements. The second dimension reflects social issues and has a more normal distribution. In the civil rights era (e.g., the 90th Congress, 1967–68), the second dimension tended to be driven by racial issues; in recent years (e.g., the 111th Congress, 2009–10), it is driven by cultural and lifestyle issues (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Poole and Rosenthal 1997). The two dimensions are orthogonal. In the 111th Congress, for example, the correlation is a mere −0.06 ($p = .16$).

In each iteration of this modified simulation, I drew three randomly chosen pairs of ideal points. The first was assigned to the governor, the second to the legislature, and the third to the status quo. For the one-dimensional simulations, I used only first-dimension DW-NOMINATE scores. For the two-dimensional simulations, I used paired first- and second-dimension DW-NOMINATE scores. Once ideal points were assigned in this manner, the simulations proceeded as before. As it happens, these modified simulations produced the same substantive results as those presented previously. Whether I use DW-NOMINATE scores from the 1960s (in part C of Table 1) or from recent years (in part D), the percentages in the rightmost columns are similar to those reported above.[17] The item veto still has a large potential effect.

Simulations, of course, do not use real data, nor do they allow players to try strategies other than those they are programmed to use. Nevertheless, these simulations are valuable inasmuch as they illustrate the aggregate outcomes that we might expect the model given above to produce if the legislature and governor play this sort of game regularly. My multidimensional model showed that item vetoes would matter only

under certain circumstances. These simulations suggest that those circumstances might arise very frequently, especially as dimensionality rises, but also in as few as two dimensions.

Discussion

Kiewiet and McCubbins (1985; 1988) showed that the (full) veto gives executives only a conditional influence over legislative outcomes: Executives can limit legislative action, but they cannot prod it. I have not challenged that basic finding. By extending the Kiewiet–McCubbins model into a multidimensional context, however, I have shown that legislatures can significantly reduce whatever influence executives might hope to gain from their veto power. By bundling unrelated issues into a single omnibus bill, shrewd legislators can lead an executive to accept policy proposals that might otherwise receive a veto if the same issues were handled separately.

I have argued that an item veto's most important effect is to force legislative outcomes to be the same as if all bargaining occurred in a unidimensional space. No matter how many issues the legislature bundles together into an omnibus bill, the presence of an item veto compels the legislature to propose the same outcome as if each part of the bill were handled separately. In effect, then, an item veto's role is to force legislative-executive bargaining into a unidimensional space. Thus, the best way to understand an item veto's potential influence is to compare multidimensional bargaining over a set of issues to unidimensional bargaining over the exact same set of issues. In my spatial model, I found that an item veto was likely to have a different effect from the full veto only in certain circumstances. However, my simulations suggest that those circumstances might arise very frequently. I conclude, then, that the potential effect of the item veto is large.

My simulations return this result even when issues are randomly paired together by nature into a single bill. I have not addressed the possibility that the legislature might be smarter than nature. In reality, we might expect the legislature to strategically choose which issues to bundle (and how many to bundle) to maximize its bargaining advantages over the governor. If bills are bundled strategically, not randomly, then the presence of an item veto might have an even larger effect in practice than these simulations suggest.

These findings apply to any dimensionality-reducing institution, not just the item veto. For example, 40 state constitutions stipulate that legislative bills must contain only one subject (Martorano Miller, Hamm, and Hedlund 2010); one more state (Mississippi) has constitutional language implying a germaneness requirement (National Conference of State Legislatures 2011). These single-subject rules, if strictly enforced by the courts, would prevent a legislature from strategically bundling bills together in the same way that an item veto can (cf. Townsend 1985). In 2008, for example, Utah's legislature bundled several unpopular proposals together with essential appropriations measures into a single omnibus bill (SB 2) containing 14 distinct policy changes. Through this bundling, the legislative majority forced the governor's

hand and prevented him from vetoing the least popular provisions. Such antics would hardly raise an eyebrow in Congress—but in Utah, they provoked a court challenge based on the violation of the state constitution's single-subject rule. Had each policy been addressed separately, few would have received the governor's signature.

Line item vetoes produce the same dimensionality-reducing effect. A total of 44 states allow item vetoes, although 30 limit their use to appropriations bills (Wall 2008, 185-6). In states where item vetoes are restricted to certain types of bills, their dimensionality-reducing effect would obviously be limited to those particular bills. But in those circumstances where item vetoes may be used, they would have the same effect as single-subject rules when it comes to strengthening the governor relative to the legislature. No matter how many issues may be bundled into a single bill, the presence of an item veto forces the outcome to be the same as if each issue were handled separately.

My findings, of course, raise an important question: Why has the empirical literature struggled to find strong evidence of the item veto's effects?[18] There are two possible explanations. First, the item veto acts as a deterrent that structures the legislature's and governor's initial proposals. As noted by Schap (2006), "An executive's influence is actually exercised much more subtly and earlier in the process, whether or not an actual veto subsequently materializes." Indeed, Strauch (1998) has found that governors endowed with an item veto tend to make systematically different budget proposals than governors who lack this power.[19] If governors are adjusting their initial proposals based on their institutional power, then comparing gubernatorial proposals to enacted laws (as some studies have done) may not be an effective way to identify the item veto's effects. By contrast, Strauch's approach appears more defensible.

Second, if the item veto's primary effect is to reduce the effective dimensionality of the bargaining space, then the widespread presence of other dimensionality-reducing institutions may complicate empirical analysis. As noted earlier, 41 states have an explicit or implied single-subject rule in their constitutions, which can have the same effects on legislative-executive bargaining as an item veto. Almost every state has one or both of these dimensionality-reducing institutions.[20] As such, empirical efforts to estimate the item veto's effects may be undermined by the presence of other dimensionality-reducing institutions. Future empirical research should carefully consider these other institutions.

My model suggests that the item veto may have large effects on the legislative-executive balance of power, even if these effects are difficult to detect empirically. This conclusion suggests that the anecdotes related above about Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan, and George W. Bush may not have arisen by accident. Members of Congress have had many years to discover that they can avoid presidential vetoes by tucking irrelevant provisions that the president finds distasteful into larger bills that the president supports. What is striking about these anecdotes is not that Congress bundled unrelated issues, but that these presidents took the unusual step of issuing a veto as a result. More often, presidents routinely sign bills filled with hundreds or thousands of pork projects even after complaining about the total level of pork or about other riders.

Almost all states have constitutional provisions that limit the legislature's ability to bundle unrelated issues, such as a single-subject rule or an item veto. There are no similar dimensionality-reducing institutions in the U.S. Congress. Other things being equal, then, we might expect the American president to have far less influence over legislative outcomes than most American governors.

Acknowledgment

I thank Jay Goodliffe, members of Brigham Young University's Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, and participants at the 2011 conference of the Midwest Political Science Association for helpful comments. Robert Richards provided expert research assistance.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

1. Spatial models are useful in many contexts, but not all. In particular, they may be less relevant when discussing budget negotiations. Budget battles are unique in that failure to agree on a new budget may lead to government shutdown. As such, Kousser and Phillips (2008) suggest that each player's patience plays such a central role that spatial models fade in importance, with the length of the legislative session critically influencing the legislative-executive balance of power. State budget battles also involve battles over fiscal balance (surplus, deficit, balance) and scale in addition to battles over spending priorities (Alt and Lowry 1994; 2000), further complicating the bargaining situation. All spatial models—mine included—may have diminished relevance in the special case of budgeting.
2. The unitary legislature's ideal point may reflect the median legislator (Krehbiel 1998) or the median member of the majority party (Battista 2011; Cox and McCubbins 1993; 2005). The specific identify of the pivotal legislator is irrelevant here.
3. The status quo is more accurately conceived of as the "reversion point," or the policy that will obtain if the legislature and governor fail to agree. When bargaining over a regulatory policy, failure by the governor and legislature to agree results in a continuation of the status quo. But when bargaining over a budget, failure to agree may result in a government shutdown instead of in a continuation of existing spending levels. The logic presented here works in either context, with the provision that Figure 1's "Issue 3" will never occur if the reversion point is a government shutdown.
4. Matthews (1989), for example, shows that costless rhetoric and veto threats can compensate for incomplete information. Ingberman and Yao (1991) add a third stage to the model by allowing the governor to make a public (costly) veto threat prior to the legislature's

proposal, which increases the governor's return but leaves the basic conclusion about conditionality intact. Taking the opposite tack, Groseclose and McCarty (2001) argued that public pressures may lead a president to accept an otherwise objectionable bill to signal voters that he or she is moderate. Cameron (2001) made the game repetitive and added a third player, the veto override pivot, to show that governors might strategically veto an acceptable bill in an effort to get the legislature to propose an even better offer in the next round. In all these extensions, however, the basic insight remains: Vetoes are a conditional tool that can be used to limit the legislature more than to prod it.

5. Bush vetoed HR 1585, the "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008," on December 28, 2007 over objections to section 1083, a 5-page portion of the 600-page bill. Congress soon passed a nearly identical bill (HR 4986) with the same title but a revised version of section 1083, which Bush signed on January 28, 2008.
6. Among others, Roemer, Lee, and van der Straeten (2007) have recently discussed this sort of multidimensionality in politics.
7. In Figure 2, the location of G and SQ are contrived so as to easily illustrate three different bargaining situations. This configuration is not at all crucial to the generalized results contained in the text.
8. To find the exact location of P_{1M} in *n* dimensions, let *D* equal the linear distance between G_1 and SQ_1 as calculated using the generalized Pythagorean theorem. To avoid a veto, we know that P_{1M} will be at distance *D* from G_1. To minimize the distance from L_1, P_{1M} will lie along the straight line connecting G_1 and L_1. Let *E* equal the linear distance between G_1 and L_1. Then P_{1M}'s exact coordinates are given by $P_{1M} = L_1 \times (D/E) + G_1 \times (E - D)/E$. The simulations below use this formula to solve the multidimensional game in "compromise" situations—i.e., when *E* is greater than *D*; when *E* is less than *D*, we infer "legislative dominance" as in Situation 2.
9. Results for additional dimensions may be obtained at http://adambrown.info/p/research/veto
10. There were two stalemates in two dimensions, rounding down to 0.0%. There were no stalemates in higher dimensionality.
11. To place these linear distances in perspective, recall that each ideal point is assigned coordinates drawn from a normal distribution with a standard deviation of 100.
12. The minor fall from 91.7 to 86.1 as the simulation shifts into two dimensions is no cause for concern. It seems to arise as an artifact of the increased frequency of this outcome (from 16.5% to 50.1%); in those many new situations where compromise had not been possible under unidimensionality, only modest compromise was possible under two dimensions. Once the frequency of the compromise outcome levels off (beginning with three-dimensional bargaining), the legislature's utility gains under this outcome rise at a more consistent rate.
13. I stress that the governor's *utility gain relative to the status quo*, not *utility level*, would have been 50% larger. Throughout this article, I have assumed that each player's utility declines as the policy outcome grows more distant from his or her peak preference. That is, there is an inverse correspondence between utility and distance from the peak preference. For purposes of this paragraph and the next, to facilitate a more intuitive interpretation

of my simulated results, I impose a more stringent assumption about each player's utility function: that each player's utility under any given outcome declines in a perfectly linear fashion as the outcome's linear distance from the peak preference increases. This assumption is not necessary elsewhere in the article.

14. For example, if a bill touches on a larger number of issues, then more committees and credit-seeking legislators (Mayhew 1974) will want to have a hand in its creation, raising the transaction costs of passing it.
15. Readers may adjust the simulation's parameters to any values they choose and view the results (up to 10 dimensions) by using an online simulation tool at the author's website: http://adambrown.info/p/research/veto
16. These scores are described at length in Poole and Rosenthal (1997). They can be found at http://voteview.com/dwnomin_joint_house_and_senate.htm
17. DW-NOMINATE scores range from −1 to +1. I rescaled them here from −100 to +100. Still, their range is much smaller than the range of ideal points used in my preceding simulations, where ideal points were drawn from a normal distribution with a standard deviation of 100. As such, figures expressed in utils (not percentages) in this table are much smaller in simulations C and D than in simulations A and B.
18. Holtz-Eakin (1988) and Nice (1988) find no long-term effect of the item veto on the size of state budgets, although Holtz-Eakin (1988) and Levinson (1988) find that the presence of the item veto can modestly shape the composition of the budget. By contrast, Dearden and Husted (1993) do find that item vetoes result in spending levels somewhat closer to the governor's proposed budget. Abney and Lauth (1997) survey state officials and find a widespread belief that the item veto strengthens the governor, but they do not support this finding with any examination of policy outputs.
19. I have struggled in vain to locate a copy of Strauch's original article. My characterization of it is based on a summary in Knight and Levinson (2000), which appears in a volume edited by Strauch himself.
20. The nine states lacking an explicit or implied constitutional single-subject rule are Arkansas, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The six states lacking any form of item veto are Indiana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The four lacking both are New Hampshire, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Vermont—and it may be that these states have other dimensionality-reducing institutions, such as a legislative rule requiring that all amendments be germane.

References

Abney, Glenn, and Thomas P. Lauth. 1997. "The Item Veto and Fiscal Responsibility." *Journal of Politics* 59:882–92.

Abney, Glenn, and Thomas P. Lauth. 1998. "The End of Executive Dominance in State Appropriations." *Public Administration Review* 58:388–94.

Alt, James E., and Robert C. Lowry. 1994. "Divided Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Budget Deficits: Evidence From the States." *American Political Science Review* 88 (December): 811–28.

Alt, James E., and Robert C. Lowry. 2000. "A Dynamic Model of State Budget Outcomes Under Divided Partisan Government." *Journal of Politics* 62 (November): 1035–69.

Battista, James Coleman. 2011. "Formal and Perceived Leadership Power in U.S. State Legislatures." *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 11 (March): 102–18.

Cameron, Charles M. 2001. *Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Carter, John R., and David Schap. 1987. "Executive Veto, Legislative Override, and Structure-Induced Equilibrium." *Public Choice* 52:227–44.

Carter, John R., and David Schap. 1990. "Line-Item Veto, Where is Thy Sting?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 4 (2): 103–18.

Clucas, Richard A. 2003. "Improving the Harvest of State Legislative Research." *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 4 (Winter): 387–419.

Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

De Figueiredo, Rui. Jr. 2003. "Budget Institutions and Political Insulation: Why States Adopt the Item Veto." *Journal of Public Economics* 87 (December): 2677–701.

Dean, John W. 2006. "The Problem With Presidential Signing Statements: Their Use and Misuse by the Bush Administration." FindLaw commentary, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20060113.html (accessed January 13).

Dearden, James A., and David Schap. 1994. "The First Word and the Last Word in the Budgetary Process: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Proposal and Veto Authorities." *Public Choice* 81 (1–2): 35–53.

Dearden, James A., and Thomas A. Husted. 1990. "Executive Budget Proposals, Executive Veto, Legislative Override, and Uncertainty: A Comparative Analysis of the Budget Process." *Public Choice* 65 (1): 1–19.

Dearden, James A., and Thomas A. Husted. 1993. "Do Governors Get What They Want? An Alternative Examination of the Line-Item Veto." *Public Choice* 77 (4): 707–23.

Dometrius, Nelson C. 1979. "Measuring Gubernatorial Power." *Journal of Politics* 41 (May): 589–610.

Dometrius, Nelson C. 1987. "Changing Gubernatorial Power: The Measure vs. Reality." *Western Political Quarterly* 40 (June): 319–28.

Duggan, John, Tasos Kalandrakis, and Vikram Manjunath. 2008. "Dynamics of the Presidential Veto: A Computational Analysis." *Mathematical and Computer Modelling* 48:1570–89.

Ferguson, Margaret Robertson. 2003. "Chief Executive Success in the Legislative Arena." *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 3 (Summer): 158–82.

Groseclose, Tim, and Nolan McCarty. 2001. "The Politics of Blame: Bargaining Before an Audience." *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (January): 100–19.

Holtz-Eakin, Douglas. 1988. "The Line-Item Veto and Public Sector Budgets." *Journal of Public Economics* 36:269–92.

Indridason, Indridi H. 2011. "Executive Veto Power and Credit Claiming: Comparing the Effects of the Line-Item Veto and the Package Veto." *Public Choice* 146 (March): 375–94.

Ingberman, Daniel E., and Dennis A. Yao. 1991. "Presidential Commitment and the Veto." *American Journal of Political Science* 35 (May): 357–89.

Kiewiet D. Roderick, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1985. "Appropriations Decisions as a Bilateral Bargaining Game Between President and Congress." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 10 (May): 181–201.

Kiewiet D. Roderick, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1988. "Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions." *American Journal of Political Science* 32 (August): 713–36.

Knight, Brian, and Arik Levinson. 2000. "Fiscal Institutions in U.S. States." In *Institutions, Politics, and Fiscal Policy*, eds. Rolf R. Strauch and Jürgen von Hagen. Norwell, Massachusetts: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Kousser, Thad, and Justin H. Phillips. 2008. "Who Blinks First? Legislative Patience and Bargaining With Governors." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 34 (January): 55–86.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Levinson, Arik. 1998. "Balanced Budgets and Business Cycles: Evidence From U.S. States." *National Tax Journal* 51 (December): 715–32.

Martorano Miller, Nancy, Keith E. Hamm, and Ronald D. Hedlund. 2010. "State Legislative Evolution: Path Dependency, Organization Theory, and Bounded Rational Choice." Presented at the 10th Annual State Policy and Politics Conference, held in Springfield, Illinois.

Matthews, Steven A. 1989. "Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 104 (May): 347–69.

Mayhew, David R. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. *Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Mooney, Christopher Z. 2009. "Term Limits as a Boon to Legislative Scholarship: A Review." *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 9 (Summer): 204–28.

National Conference of State Legislatures. 2011. *Germaneness Requirements*. http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13526 (accessed October 6, 2011).

Nice, David C. 1988. "The Item Veto Expenditure Restraint." *Journal of Politics* 50:487–99.

Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Roemer, John E., Woojin Lee, and Karine van der Straeten. 2007. *Racism, Xenophobia, and Distribution: Multi-Issue Politics in Advanced Democracies*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Schap, David. 2006. "Line Item Veto: Lessons From the Literature." In *The Elgar Companion to Public Economics: Empirical Public Economics*, eds. Attiat F. Ott and Richard J. Cebula. Northampton. MA: Edward Elgar.

Squire, Peverill. 1992. "Legislative Professionalism and Membership Diversity in State Legislatures." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 17:69–79.

Squire, Peverill. 2007. "Measuring State Legislative Professionalism: The Squire Index Revisited." *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 7 (Summer): 211–27.

Strauch, Rolf. 1998. "The Strategic Structure of the Budget Process: Evidence From the U.S. States." Working paper. University of Bonn.

Townsend, Nancy J. 1985. "Single Subject Restrictions as an Alternative to the Line-Item Veto." *Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics, & Public Policy* 1 (2): 227–58.

Wall, Audrey S. 2008. *The Book of the States*. Vol. 40. Lexington, KY: Council of State Governments.

Bio

Adam Brown is an assistant professor of political science at Brigham Young University and a research fellow with the university's Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy.